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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AT THE MILLENNIUM: THE
DECLINE OF THE POISON PILL ANTITAKEOVER
DEFENSE
John H. Matheson'
"[T]he emergence of the 'poison pill' as an effective takeover
device has resulted in such a remarkable transformation in the
market for corporate control .... "2
"In the ever-evolving field of corporate takeover jurisprudence,
the defensive mechanism that has mutated more rapidly than oth-
ers, and has prompted the most widespread debate, is the 'poison
pill' rights plan. Since making its legal debut in 1985, the story of
the poison pill has been work in progress .... ,3
I. INTRODUCTION
As recently as twenty years ago, the ability and desire of corporate
shareholders to mount a challenge over corporate governance 4 seemed
unlikely. After all, shareholders were considered to be passive, impotent,
and unconcerned with anything but the value of their investment.
Although shareholders of decades past were admittedly passive and
powerless, today's shareholder activism is fueled largely by the institutional
investor.' In short, a shareholder revolution has occurred, highlighted by the
ascendancy of the institutional investor. Accompanying the institutional
investors' growth and concentration of share ownership is their desire and
ability to participate meaningfully in governance issues. "[A]n extraordi-
nary ferment of activity in the field of corporate governance" has resulted.6
The primary device standing in the path of unfettered monitoring of
corporate management by these institutional shareholders and the market for
corporate control has been the antitakeover mechanism known as the share-
I. S. Walter Richey Professor of Corporate Law. University of Minnesota Law School. Of Counsel, Kaplan, Strangis
and Kaplan. P.A.
2. Unitrin. Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361. 1379 (Del. 1995).
3. Mentor Graphis Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys.. Inc.. 1998 WL 839079 (Del. Ch. Dec. 3, 1998), arfd, 721 A.2d
1281 (Del. 1998).
4. As used herein, "corporate governance" defines the process by which the balance of power between a corporation's
shareholders and nonsharcholders is allocated. Nonshareholder. include the corporation's board of directors, officers, creditors,
suppliers, and customers. The current framework of corporate governance is defined through state.enacted corporate codes, case
law, and customized corporation-specific provisions such as articles of incorporation and bylaws.
5. Commentators have explained:
[W]e are now witnessing the reaggloneration ofownership of the largest corporations, so that long.
term shareholders are well on the way to majority ownership of America's companies. They are, of
course, the institutional shareholders, who invest collections of individuals' assets through pension
funds, trusts. indurance companies, and other entities.
ROBERT A. MONKS & NELL MINOW, POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY 18 (1991).
6. Roswell B. Perkins. The President's Letter. 4 A.L.I. REP. 1 (1982), quoted in Melvin A. Eisenberg, An Introduction
to the American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project. 52 GEO. WASH. L. RyV. 495, 496 (1984).
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holder rights plan or "poison pill."7 So significant is this device in the
defensive arsenal of publicly traded corporations that thousands of compa-
nies have adopted it, including some sixty-two percent of the S&P 500.8 In
1997 alone over 300 new shareholder rights plans were adopted.9
Institutional investors have gone from expressing intense criticism of
this device to challenging particular aspects of its operation, in addition to
seeking mandatory removal of it from the arsenal of corporate defenses.
The resolution of this issue is closely tied to the evolution of the nature and
role of modem institutional investors and the role of hostile takeovers in the
market for corporate control 0 as a monitoring device upon management."
Moreover, the intense controversy surrounding this corporate governance
battle appears inevitable given the far-reaching economic and social impact
of the modem corporation. 2
Although "the 1980s witnessed an unprecedented development in the
law surrounding corporate governance,"' 3 the 1990s have proven to be even
more ground-breaking. The unveiling of the American Law Institute's Prin-
ciples of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations (ALl
Project) 14 ranks among the major governance developments of this decade.
Its fifteen-year gestation yielded an impressive treatise on corporate law and
governance. "
Part II of this Article will trace the historical development of corporate
governance. Parts III, IV and V will highlight three crucial developments
leading to the current governance landscape, namely, the expanded role of
7. Poison pills or shareholder rights plans typically are stock warrants or rights that allow the holder to buy a suitor's
stock ("flip-overs") or the target's stock ("flip-ins") at bargain prices while excluding the hostile purchaser from making the same
bargain purchase. See. e.g., P. John Kozyris, Corporate Takeovers at the Jurisdictional Crossroads: Preserving State Authority
Over Internal Affairs While Protecting the Transferability of Interstate Stock Through Federal Law, 36 UCLA L. REV. 1109,
1156 (1989). These bargain-purchase rights are triggered if a hostile party crosses a pre-determined threshold of target company
stock ownership, usually between 10 and 20 %. Adoption of a rights plan can be accomplished without shareholder approval and
the rights can only be redeemed by the board of directors of the adopting company. See Id. The Investor Responsibility Research
Center, an independent non-profit research group, found that 5 1% of large American companies were armored with poison pills
as of August, 1990. See Majority of Large US. Corporations Have Adopted Poison Pills, IRRC Finds [July-Dec.] SEC. REG. & L.
REp. (BNA) No. 47, at 1659 (Nov. 30, 1990). Throughout this Article the terms "poison pill" and "shareholder rights plan" will
be used interchangeably.
8. See IRRC, Corporate Governance Service 1998 Background Report E: Poison Pill, June 5, 1998, at I [hereinafter
1998 Poison Pill Report].
9. See id.
10. No governance issue has received more attention than the impact of takeovers and antitakeover weaponry upon
shareholders and nonshareholders. For commentary on this issue, see Richard A. Booth, The Promise of State Takeover Statutes,
86 MICH. L. REV. 1635 (1988); Henry N. Butler, Corporation-Specific Anti-Takeover Statutes and the Market for Corporate
Charters, 1988 WiS. L. REv. 365; John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Manager. The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH.
L. REV. I (1986); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockholders, Stakeholder, and
Bustups. 1988 Wis. L. REV. 435 [hereinafter Coffee. Takeover Reform]; Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Misreading the Will-
iams Act, 87 MICH L. REv. 1862 (1989) [hereinafter Johnson & Millon, Williams Act]; Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Missing
the Point About State Takeover Statutes, 87 MICH. L. REV. 846 (1989) (hereinafter Johnson & Millon, Missing the Point];
Donald C. Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislation Interests. Effects, and Political Competency, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 213
(1977); Johathan R. Macey, State Anti-Takeover Legislation and the National Economy. 1988 WIs. L. REv. 467 ; John H. Mathe-
son & Brent A. Olson, Shareholder Rights and Legislative Wrongs: Toward Balanced Takeover Legislation, 59 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1425 (199 1) [hereinafter Matheson & Olson]; Dale Arthur Oesterle, Revisiting the Antitakeover Fervor of the '80s. 19 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 565 (1997); Roberta Roman, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111 (1987).
II. Commentators disagree on the effectiveness of hostile takeovers to discipline corporate management for varying
reasons. Compare Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Krakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investor,
43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 870-71 (1991) ("Given the contribution of hostile takeovers to portfolio values during the 1980s, institu-
tional investors were quite right to target defensive tactics in their initial foray into corporate governance debate .... [Neverthe-
less, the] hostile takeover has proved to be an expensive and inexact monitoring device .... .) with Martin Lipton & Steve A.
Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 198
(199 1) (asserting that "the hostile takeover is not a particularly effective or efficient means of motivating or disciplining manag-
ers").
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the board of directors in hostile takeover contests, the development of the
poison pill as an antitakeover device, and the rise to power of the institu-
tional investor. Part VI will explore the altered balance of power resulting
from the recent successful legal challenges to the most significant provisions
of the poison pill and its resulting detoxification in many circumstances.
The active battle by institutional shareholders to force redemption of poison
pills in individual companies is also examined. Part VII considers the future
of corporate governance in this new context.
H. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE - THE BATTLE FOR CON-
TROL
The relationship between shareholders and nonshareholders in the
operation of the modern public corporation appears to have a dialectical
character: 16 as the power of one expands, the power of the other diminishes;
the strength of the one often causes the other to react and to expand its
power. Thus, commentators often view shareholder and nonshareholder
interests as opposing and mutually exclusive. Modern shareholders, they
argue, typically seek short-term profit while nonshareholders typically seek
12. "Today ... the corporation is the dominant form of business organization[,] ... account[ing] for about 89 percent of
business receipts .... [Olverall, the business corporation is the principal form for carrying out business activities in this country."
ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 1.1, 1-2 (1986). Few governance issues affect society as broadly and intensely as corpo-
rate takeovers. Thus, "[n]o current corporate issue has attracted more attention from legal and economic scholars than takeover
defensive moves by corporate manager." Larry E. Ribstein, Takeover Defense and the Corporate Contract, 78 GEO. LJ. 71, 72
(1989).
For commentary probing major economic concerns over takeover activity and antitakeover devices, see Lucian A.
Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028 (1982); John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the
Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1145 (1984); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Rischel, Corporate Control Transaction, 91 YALE L.J. 698 (1982) [hereinafter
Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions]; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Tar-
get's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 95 HAR. L. REV. 1161 (1981) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, The
Proper Role]; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Takeover Bids. Defensive Tactics. and Shareholders' Welfare, 36 BUS.
L. 1733 (1981) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids]; Ronald J Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Pas-
sivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51 (198 1); Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case
Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Years Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981) [hereinafter Gilson, A Structual Approach]; Mar.
tin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. I (1987) [hereinafter Lipton, Corpo-
rate Governance]; Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom: A Response to Professors Easterbrook & Fishcel,
55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231 (1980) [hereinafter Lipton, Target's Boardroom]; Matheson & Olson, supra note 10; Dale A. Oesterle.
Target Managers as Negotiating Agents for Target Shareholders in Tender Offers: A Reply to the Passivity Thesis, 71 CORNELL
L. REV. 53 (1985); Alan Schwartz, Search Theory and the Tender Offer Auction, 2 J.L. ECON. & OR. 229 (1986). See also Henry
G. Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1427, 1434-44 (1964) (explaining how shareholders
may react to tender bids, mergers, and proxy fights).
13. D. BLOCK ET. AL, THE BUSINESS JUDGEMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIEs OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS I (3d ed.
1989). The authors further note that "[t]he early 1990s will likely prove an equally active period .... "Id. at 41.
14. See AMERICAN LAW INSTTUr, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(1994) [hereinafter ALl PROJECT].
15. In addition, commentators advanced three significant corporate governance proposals during this decade. The Lip.
ton/Rosenblum proposal recommends extending board terns to five years. See Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note II. The Gilson/
Kraakman proposal recommends the infusion of"professional directors." See Gilson & Krakman, supra note 1 1, at 883-92. The
Matheson/Olson proposal advocates implementing a "longterm shareholder" regime. See Matheson & Olson, supra note 10.
16. Although this Article does not attempt to describe the dialectical development of corporate law in philosophical
terms, the author recognizes that philosophical principles of the "dialectic" have fueled efforts to describe the nature and evolu.
tion of social and economic phenomenon. The proposition that certain social phenomenon evolve dialectically was forcefully
articulated by the philosophers G.W.F. Hegel and Karl Marx. See generally Joseph McCamey, Hegel, Marx, and Dialectic, in
HEGEL AND MODERN PHILOSOPHY 161 (David Lamb ed., 1987). Together, Hegel and Marx established the significance of the
dialectic for social science inquiry. See generally id.
This Article suggests that corporate law has more or less proceeded in dialectical stages. The seeds of this dialectical
progression take objective foothold in the ownership/control dichotomy intrinsic to the corporate form. As one strand of the
shareholder/manager dialectic expands its power, the other reacts to further entrench its power. The development of corporate
govemance has mirrored this intrinsic dialectical tension. The subjective manifestation of this dialectical tension is discussed in
the remainder of Part II.
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longterm protection." The American Law Institute Corporate Governance
Project describes the nature of these tensions between shareholders and one
nonshareholder group, management, as endemic to corporate governance:
The challenge for corporate law is to facilitate the development of
a corporate structure that allows management the discretion to uti-
lize its expertise on behalf of shareholders, but at the same time
establish safeguards in situations in which management might uti-
lize that discretion to favor itself at the expense of shareholders. 8
The best economic explanation for the dialectical nature of corporate
governance is the agency cost theory, 9 which emphasizes the dichotomy
between discretion and accountability. This dichotomy stems from the sepa-
ration of ownership and control,, as articulated by Adolf Berle and Gardiner
Means in their classic work, The Modern Corporation and Private Prop-
erty. 0 Berle and Means claimed that shareholders are merely passive owners
and that managers provide the true locus of control amid pervasive share-
holder passivity.2' They predicted that the separation of ownership and con-
trol would ultimately cause the demise of the corporation as a form of
private enterprise. 22 While Berle and Means accurately identified a signifi-
cant governance problem in the modem publicly traded corporation, their
prediction of corporate demise has not proven accurate. Instead, however,
the tensions between shareholders and management inherent in corporate
governance have resulted in a dialectical development of corporate gover-
nance.
A. The Shareholder Primacy Norm
The traditional shareholder primacy model of the corporation derives
from the concept that the shareholders are the owners of the corporation and,
as such, are entitled to control it, determine its fundamental policies, and
decide whether to make fundamental shifts in corporate policy and practice.
This system of corporate governance developed its essential attributes when
"owners managed and managers owned,"23 which was essentially an accu-
rate description of most corporate enterprises at the beginning of the last
century. There was not a wide dispersion of share ownership, there were
few institutional investors, and the shares of most corporations were owned
17. See, e.g., Liplon & Rosenblum, supra note i I, at 214- I.
I". ALl PROJECT, Supra note 14, at 519 (introductory note to Part VI).
19. Michael Jensen and William Meckling originated and defined the term "agency costs." See Michael C. Jensen &
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305,
308 (1976).
20. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERIN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 301 (rev. ed.
1967).
21. See Id. at 355-56.
22. See Id.
23. ALFRED D. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 9-10
[Vol. 22:3
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by the founders or local investors. Other potential corporate constituencies
took their place after and only to the extent the shareholders determined, by
contract or conscience, to be so bound.
The viability of this model derives from economic common sense.
Only shareholders have strong incentives to maximize profits, thereby pro-
moting economic efficiency.24 In the shareholder primacy model, the share-
holder vote traditionally, has been seen as an important mechanism for
shareholder control over corporate decisions.25 Shareholders vote to elect
and remove directors.26 The board in turn designates officers to act as agents
of the corporation. In addition, fundamental corporate transactions require
shareholder approval. For example, shareholders normally must vote on
mergers," dissolutions,2 or sales of substantially all of a corporation's
assets.29 Within this model, however, the board is presumed to act as a surro-
gate for and in the interests of the shareholders.
B. Managerial Capitalism
Whether or not theoretically sound, the reign of the economic-based
shareholder primacy concept of corporate governance was short-lived.3"
Stressing separation of ownership from control as the most important factor
in corporate governance, Berle and Means in 1933 questioned the reality of
"shareholder primacy."'" They claimed that shareholders were merely pas-
sive owners; managers provided the true locus of control amid pervasive
shareholder passivity. Berle and Means asserted that, in an increasing num-
ber of large companies, management was not chosen by shareholders but
rather was a self-perpetuating oligarchy. 2 Management controlled the
director nomination process and the proxy machinery, resulting in a system
of managerial capitalism. 33
The separation of ownership and control enhances the likelihood that
those controlling the corporation will lack an incentive to maximize effi-
ciency and shareholder profitability because of pressures to diverge from the
interests of shareholders. With the separation of ownership from control also
24. See CLARK, supra note 12, § 9.5, at 389. Clark has explained:
From an economic point of view, there is a strong argument that the power to control a business
firm's activities should reside in those who have the right to the firm's residual earnings .... The
intuition behind this argument is that giving control to the residual claimants will place the power to
monitor the performance of participants in the firm and the power to control shirking, waste, and so
forth in the hands ofthose who have the best incentive to use the power.
Id. See also Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON.
REv. 777, 787-88 (1972) (explaining the nature of the control exerted by residual claimants over management).
25. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan. A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy Towards Proxy Contests, 78
CAL. L. REv. 1071, 1073 (1990).
26. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (1991).
27. See, e.g., id. § 251(c).
28. See, e.g., id. § 275.
29. See, e.g., id. § 271.
30. Of course, the shareholder primacy model still holds forth in many closely held corporations because the sharehold-
ers often wear multiple governance hats, serving also as directors, officers, and employees of the business.
31. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 20, at 244.
32. See id. at 124.
33. See id. See also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel VYoting in Corporate Law, 26 J. L. & ECON. 395,419-20
(1983) (stating that "shareholders' involvement in the voting process has not increased with the adoption of the proxy rules').
1999]
HAMLINE LAW REVIEW
came the potential for managers to pursue their own self-interested agendas
more aggressively within the corporate framework. When directors face
claims for consideration from multiple interests or are self-interested,34
shareholders cannot rely fully upon the directors' business judgment.
Delaware law, for example, provides that either the disinterested board
members, the shareholders, or the courts may validate a transaction in which
managers' interests clearly diverge from those of shareholders. 3  Wein-
berger v. UOP, Inc.36 stated the modem formula for judicial review of trans-
actions involving direct conflicts of interest. Weinberger held that
"directors . . [who] are on both sides of a transaction ... are required to
demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fair-
ness of the bargain."3
However, the types of conflicts and self-interested actions engendered
by managerial capitalism typically do not call into play this strict standard of
review. Rather, such conflicts are more subtle. For example, the pursuit of
longterm stability, the reinvestment of earnings, and the growth and diversi-
fication of the corporate business tend to solidify the corporate enterprise
and maintain managers in their positions. From this perspective, current
earnings and profits may take on secondary importance.38
As the nature of the corporate dynamic changed, so did the nature of
corporate law. Corporate codes became "enabling," thereby presumptively
allowing contracting parties (i.e., managers and investors) much flexibility
to determine the terms of the corporate charter and to establish corporate
governance regimes free from most legal intervention.39
To be effective tools for efficient contracting, these enabling corporate
codes presume the ability of contracting parties to make their wishes known.
Despite the original conception of the corporation, in which the shareholders
exercised primary control, modem corporate codes developed their essential
character when "[e]ach shareholder owned few shares and lacked the means
or inclination to participate actively [in corporate matters]. '40 The separa-
tion of ownership from control and the concomitant ability of managers to
control the proxy process therefore left owners without traditional control or
the ability to negotiate effectively with management. As mentioned earlier,
the resulting loss in efficiency and the expense in designing alternative
means to control management discretion have been aptly described as
34. This conflict between duty and self interest arises either when directors stand on both sides of a transaction or when
they may otherwise reap some personal benefit from their actions.
35. See Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 404 (Del. 1987); Merritt v. Colonial Foods, 505 A.2d 757, 764 (Del. Ch.
1986). See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (1991) (noting the presumptive validity of transactions approved by disinterested
directors or shareholders).
36. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
37. Id. at 710.
38. As to these actions, strict judicial scrutiny does not come into play. Rather, the courts apply the hands-off business
judgment rule to directors' informed decisions, erecting a presumption of good faith, thereby barring legal intervention that might
substitute judicial judgment for those actions presumptively best left to managers.
39. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 CoLuM. L. REv. 1416, 1417(1989).
40. George W. Dent, Jr., Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public Corporation, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 88 1,
[Vol. 22:3
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"agency costs."41
C. Monitoring Management
The great challenge of corporate law in the modem era, then, is to min-
imize agency costs by constraining abuse of managerial discretion. Agency
costs stemming from the ownership/control dichotomy may be minimized in
a variety of ways. First, corporate law imposes liability for breaches of fidu-
ciary duties. Fiduciary principles constrain managerial discretion by govern-
ing the web of agency relationships constituting the corporate structure. 42
Charged with managing the corporation4 3 directors owe a fiduciary duty to
shareholders to act in their best interests." This duty of care is circumscribed
by the business judgment rule, the common law "presumption that in mak-
ing a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed
basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action was in the best
interests of the company. '4 Consistent with the business judgment rule, lia-
bility will not attach for breach of the duty of care unless the director acted
with gross negligence. 46
Second, in addition to fiduciary duties, there has been a push by regula-
tory authorities and, to some extent, shareholders, to require that corpora-
tions have independent directors on their boards. The purpose for this
requirement is the presumption that such directors, independent of manage-
ment, will monitor management activities for the benefit of shareholders.
According to this modified form of the shareholder primacy model, these
monitoring mechanisms limit managerial discretion in an effort to conform
managerial conduct with the interests of shareholders. Thus, corporate law
provides the mechanisms to minimize agency costs by guaranteeing that
management will attempt to maximize shareholder value. This discre-
tion-constraining model of corporate governance stresses that managers,
inclined to pursue their own selfish motives, have intrinsic conflicts of inter-
ests with shareholders.47 Reconciling the shareholder primacy tenet with the
Berle and Means thesis, scholars endorsing this model assert that the law
41. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & W.H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Own-
ership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 293 (1988).'
42. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, supra note 12, at 700. "The entire corporate structure
is a web ofagency relationships. Investors delegate authority to directors, who subdelegate to upper managers, and so on." Id.
43. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991) ("The business [of a corporation] ... shall be managed by or under
the direction of a board of directors").
44. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 4g8 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (citing Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 2 A.2d 225 (Del. Ch.
1938), affid, 5 A.2d. 503 (Del. Super. Ct. 1939)) ("In carrying out their managerial roles, directors are charged with an unyielding
fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders.").
45. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d g05, 812 (Del. 1984). The business judgment rule is a creation of common law.
See generally id. at 812. There are no statutory formulations of the business judgment rule. See generally id. By invoking the
business judgment rule, courts seek to avoid second-guessing the merits of a business decision provided there is no evidence of
bad faith or self-dealing. See generally id.
46. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 n.6. Gross negligence is the Delaware standard, governing many publicly traded corpora-
tions. Other jurisdictions theoretically apply an ordinary negligence standard, but the application of that standard together with
the presumption of the business judgment rule operates to approximate the Delaware gross negligence standard.
47. See Easterbrook & Fisehel, The Proper Role, supra note 12, at 1169-70 (stating that discipline serves to check man-
agement's tendency "to shirk responsibilities, consume perquisites, or otherwise take more than the corporation promised to give
them); Gilson, A Structural Approach. supra note 12, at 836 (unless checked, management will seek "to maximize their own
welfare rather than the shareholders").
1999]
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must impose controls on management to ensure it is responsible to share-
holders and the public.48
Managers and directors, however, are not inalterably self-interested-
-after all, most managers and directors diligently attempt to maximize share-
holder value.49 Furthermore, numerous corporations provide managers with
financial incentives to maximize corporate profitability, thereby tending to
align shareholder and nonshareholder interests.A0 The combined effects of
these factors, together with the monitoring provided by shareholders, supply
the strongest support for the claim that monitoring mechanisms effectively
minimize agency costs.
In addition, market forces, like the market for corporate control, may
also constrain managerial abuses. At one extreme, this monitoring model
views shareholders as owners of the corporation and posits that stock owner-
ship is like ownership of any other property." Unhappy shareholders can
simply sell their shares to others. At the least, such conduct should evidence
their displeasure with management. If sold to a bidder in a tender offer, such
a sale might result in the ouster of management. Throughout the 1970s and
much of the 1980s, this market in corporate control acted as an important
mechanism for monitoring corporate behavior. 2
Consistent with the market-monitoring model, corporate law should
merely seek to facilitate the operation of the market and reduce transaction
costs. Thus, the corporation simply substitutes for costly, multiple contrac-
tual arrangements to increase efficiency and maximize profits. Supporters of
the market model tend to ally themselves with the efficient capital market
hypothesis which decrees that, even when a change of control is not threat-
ened, stock prices accurately reflect all available information about the cor-
poration, including the extent of agency costs because of
management-protecting behavior. 3 The market-monitoring model places
substantial emphasis on the invisible hand of the marketplace.14 It stresses
that the optimal governance structure must derive from experience rather
than theory. Corporations persuading shareholders that they offer the highest
return will garner the largest investments. Thus, only firms and managers
making choices that investors would ordinarily prefer will prosper relative
to other companies." Discretion-constraining rules are thus thought unnec-
essary to the extent that market forces sufficiently curb managerial discre-
48. See Elliott Goldstein, The Relationship Between the Model Corporation Act and the Principles of Corporate Gover-
nance: Analysis and Recommendations, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 501,501 (1984).
49. See JAY W. LOR$SC, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALTY OF AMERICA'S CORPORATE BOARDS 30 (1989).
50. Consider, for example, incentivelmorit compensation tied to stock value appreciation, earnings, or profit increases.
See Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 11, at 196-97.
51. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role, supra note 12, at 1191, 1201.
52. See, e.g., Matheson & Olson, slipra note 10, at 1435-38.
53. For a general overview of materials relevant to the efficient capital market hypothesis, see ROBERT W. HAMILTON,
CORPORATION FINANCE 252-95 (2d ed. 1989); Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, supra note 12, at 1734.
54. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. ReV. 1416, 1419
("Managers may do their best to take advantage oftheir investors, but they find that the dynamics of the market drive them to act
as if they had investors' interests at heart. It is almost as if there was an invisible hand.").
55. See id. at 1421.
[Vol. 22:3
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tion.
The strength of this combined legal and economic-based modified
shareholder primacy model of corporate governance is uncertain. As dis-
cussed below, shareholders' ability to dislodge entrenched management dur-
ing ongoing control transactions in the 1970s and 1980s proved intolerable
to nonshareholder forces, particularly corporate management. Nonshare-
holders responded by devising ways to stultify shareholder input while
expanding management discretion. This has resulted in the "insulated mana-
gerialism" norm of corporate governance.
D. Insulated Managerialism
While there is debate over the efficacy of internal and market-monitor-
ing mechanisms, including the hostile takeover, there is no doubt that corpo-
rate management, the courts, and state legislatures responded to the
perception, if not the reality, of the monitoring concept. Beginning in the
middle to late 1980s and carrying through the 1990s, most of the response
came in decisions and statutes limiting the ability of potential acquirers to go
directly to shareholders to gain control of a target corporation. Statutes limit-
ing or eliminating potential officer and director liability also provided insu-
lation. Since management already controlled the proxy machinery, giving
management substantially more control over the prospect and process of
control transactions brought forth an era of insulated managerialism.
Most public corporations are shielded by now-ubiquitous,
state-imposed antitakeover legislation,56 which typically endows manage-
ment with the power to reject unwelcome takeover overtures." These anti-
takeover provisions come in all shapes and sizes, including fair price
statutes, 8 disclosure statutes, 9 share rights plan endorsement statutes, 60
anti-greenmail statutes,61and cashout/redemption rights statutes.62 Two anti-
takeover statutes -- the business combination statute and the control share
acquisition statute -- overshadow the others. They demonstrate how far leg-
islatures have gone toward bolstering the pro-management antitakeover
56. See, e.g., Matheson & Olson, supra note 10, at 1439 ("By January I, 1991, at least forty-nine states had adopted
antitakeover statutes of some kind.").
57. See, e.g., Jonathon R. Macey, State Anti-Takeover Legislation and the National Economy, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 467,
468-69 (noting that all state statutes "share the common feature of serving to consolidate the ability to respond to tender offers in
the hands of the incumbent managers of [target finns]").
Maine and Pennsylvania have enacted statutes granting "appraisal rights" to nontendering shareholders, entitling
them to receive "fair value" when the suitor acquires a threshold percentage of the target's shares. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A,
§ 910 (West 1990); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 2546, 2547 (West Supp. 1991). Since the appraisal remedy may require payment
of ajudicially determined "fair" price, it introduces into the bidding process costly risks--the judge's determination of"fair value"
will surely generate much litigation; as risks increase, bids will be deterred. Although cashout statutes grant shareholders the
same protection as Maryland-type fair price statutes, cashout statutes effectively require the bidder to acquire 100% of the firm:
their mandatory redemption procedures guarantee all shareholders a fair price. See Matheson & Olson, supra note 10, at 1451-52.
58. Aimed at front-end loaded two-tiered offers, fair price statutes seek to ensure that all target shareholders are offered
and receive a "fair price" for all shares - whether tendered during the "first tier" or "second tier" -- unless the offer is approved by
a super-majority of noninterested shareholders. See Matheson & Olson, supra note 10, at 1445. Most fair price statutes are based
on Maryland's two-tier offer cash-out merger model. This model requires an "interested shareholder" to satisfy the statute's fair-
ness requirement by offering to the remaining minority the highest price paid any other shareholder before the merger announce-
ment. Failure to satisfy the fairness requirement triggers a prohibitive super-majority statutory requirement: 80% of all the
shareholders and two-thirds of all disinterested shareholders (i.e., shareholders other than the bidder) must vote to approve a
cash-out merger. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS & ASS'NS §§ 3-602, 3-603 (1985).
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landscape.
A majority of states have enacted business combination statutes. These
statutes prohibit most business combinations, such as mergers or asset
sales, 63 between a target corporation and an "interested" shareholder absent
prior board approval.64 Allowing a board to decide unilaterally whether busi-
ness combination legislation is applicable grants the board ultimate power to
determine whether to accept a tender offer. Most of these statutes render
shareholders wholly powerless to accept tender offers by guaranteeing that
no such offer will be brought to fruition without target company board
approval.
For example, New York's law prohibits business combinations
between resident domestic corporations and a twenty percent shareholder
for five years absent prior board approval s.6 Delaware modified New York's
statute66 by establishing a three-year prohibition on any business combina-
tion between a Delaware corporation and an "interested" stockholder67
acquiring fifteen percent or more of the company unless the board of direc-
tors gives prior approval. 68 Since the Delaware law covers more corpora-
tions than any other,69 the business combination statute is currently the most
pervasive form of antitakeover legislation.
59. Paralleling the disclosure requirements of the Williams Act, these statutes typically require disclosure of the
suitor's source of funds, the restructuring plans involving the target corporation, and the number of shares the suitor owns directly
(or as a beneficiary). As to the overall benefits to shareholders of state-level disclosure statutes, the United States Supreme Court
in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624,644 (1982), was unconvinced that the Illinois Act substantially enhanced the shareholders'
position. The Illinois Act sought to protect shareholders of a company subject to a tender offer by requiring disclosures regarding
the offer, assuring that shareholders have adequate time to decide whether to tender their shares, and according shareholders with-
drawal, proration, and equal consideration rights. However, the Williams Act provides these same substantive protections. "[T]he
disclosures required by the Illinois Act which go beyond those mandated by the Williams Act ... may not substantially enhance
the shareholders' ability to make informed decisions .... [We] conclude that the protections the Illinois Act affords resident
security holders are, for the most part, speculative." Id. at 644-45. For a discussion of the Williams Act, see infra notes 99-102
and accompanying text.
60. These statutes explicitly authorize directors to implement discriminatory poison pills. Most Shareholder Rights Plan
Endorsement Statutes (SRPES) allow directors to design poison pills that may include restrictions or conditions that preclude or
limit the exercise, transfer, or receipt of such rights by any suitor, or invalidate such rights held by a suitor. See, e.g., IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 23-1-35-1, 23-1-26-5 (Michie 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.06, 1701.13(f)(7) (Banks-Baldwin 1989).
61. Anti-greenmail statutes attempt to eliminate abuses associated with a target's payment of "greenmail," i.e., where
the target repurchases, at a price above its fair market value, its own stock held by an unwanted suitor. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §
302A.553 (1990). These statutes generally prohibit a target from purchasing, for more than fair market value, three percent or
more of its own stock from any shareholder who has held the shares for less than two years. Most statutes provide that the restric-
tions do not apply if both the board and a majority of shareholders approve the repurchase. See id.
62. Maine and Pennsylvania have enacted statutes that grant "appraisal rights" to nontendering shareholders, entitling
them to receive "fair value" when the suitor acquires a threshold percentage of the target's shares. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
13A, § 910 (West Supp. 1990); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 2546, 2547 (West Supp. 1991). Since the appraisal remedy may require
payment of a judicially determined "ffair" price, it introduces into the bidding process costly risks-the judge's determination of
"fair value" will surely generate much litigation; as risks increase, bids will be deterred. Although cashout statutes grant share-
holders the same protection as Maryland-type fair price statutes, cashout statutes effectively require the bidder to acquire 100/6 of
the firm: their mandatory redemption procedures guarantee all shareholders a fair price. See Matheson & Olson, supra note 10, at
1451-52.
63. "Business combination" is a comprehensive term including virtually every conceivable type of fundamental
change. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(cX3) (1991); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912(aXS) (McKinney 1986).
64. See Matheson & Olson, supra note 10, at 1521-29 (identifying twenty.eight states).
65. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912 (McKinney 1986). The New York statute prohibits both two-step bids and coer-
cive two-tier bids. With two-tier bids, the bidder announces in advance that, once control passes, the remaining shareholders will
be cashed out at a lower price than those who initially tendered in the first tier, coercing some shareholders to tender for less than
they otherwise would. The New York statute essentially prohibits hostile takeovers if the suitor plans to change the target's busi-
ness significantly.
66. Delaware's statute is manifestly less restrictive than New York's - indeed, the Delaware statute is one of the mild-
est in the nation: it applies only to suitors who acquire between 15 and 85 %ofa target's shares. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
203(aX2), (cX5) (199 1).
67. "Interested Stockholders" are shareholders that possess fifteen percent or more of a corporation's voting stock. Id. §
203(cX5).
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In addition, a majority of states have enacted control share statutes 70
that, following Indiana's lead, afford shareholders the right to determine col-
lectively whether a bidder's "control shares" accrue voting rights.71 Despite
this pro-shareholder appearance, the essential purpose of control share
acquisition statutes may be to endow the target board with the power to dis-
pose of, or at least delay, hostile tender offers. The powers granted directors
under these statutes are vast. They include the power to opt into or out of
statutory protection; 72 the power to control the timing of the shareholder
meeting; 73 the power to approve a merger unilaterally, thereby bypassing the
statute; 74 the power to issue stock to a "white knight" without triggering the
statute's provisions; 75 and the power to engage in friendly control transac-
tions. 76 In addition, the requirement that a meeting and vote be held causes
significant delay and attendant costs for the potential acquirer. More funda-
mentally, however, control share statutes dramatically alter the corporate
control terrain. Instead of making an investment decision, that is, whether to
sell their shares, shareholders are asked to vote on the acquirer's voting
rights. Thus, although control share statutes in theory grant shareholders a
much-needed voice in control transactions, 77 their ultimate effect is to grant
directors one more means of minimizing shareholder input.
The popularity of these statutes likely stems from the fact that they are
the only variety of protectionist legislation upheld by the United States
Supreme Court.78 As an antitakeover weapon, armed with disinterested
shareholder approval requirements and redemption and dissenters' rights,
68. See id. § 203(a)(1). In addition to this prior board approval, the Delaware statute provides two additional pathways
for a suitor to circumvent the three-year freeze. First, the suitor may override the freeze if the qualifying transaction results in a
suitor's owning at least eighty-five percent of the target stock. See id. § 203(aX2). Second, the suitor may override the freeze if
the business combination is approved by both the board and by two-thirds of the outstanding disinterested shares. See DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 203(aX3) (1991). The Delaware statute has withstood constitutional challenges. See, e.g., BNS, Inc. v. Koppers,
683 F. Supp. 458 (D. Del. 1988).
69. One point in time calculation showed that 56% of the Fortune 500 finns are incorporated in Delaware. See Dale A.
Oesterle, Delaware's Takeovers Statute: Of Chills, Pills, Standstills, and Who Gets Iced, 13 DEL J. CORP. L. 879, 883-84 (1988).
Forty-five percent of the firms listed with the New York Stock Exchange have Delaware as their corporate home. See id.
70. See Matheson & Olson, supra note 10, at 1533-37 (table identifying and discussing statutes in twenty-seven states).
71. See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-142 (Michie 1989). Indiana based its passive law on the more restrictive Ohio Control
Share Acquisition Statute. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.831 (Banks-Baldwin 1989). Ohio's control share law differs from
Indiana's law in one important way: the Ohio Act requires advance shareholder approval for the bidder to purchase shares that lift
its ownership over the relevant thresholds (20%, 33%, and 50%). See Booth, supra note 10, at 1678 n. 157. Also, the Ohio statute
focuses on the stock itself(rather than the voting rights of the stock) in requiring the approval of disinterested shareholders. See
Osno REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.831(a), (E) (Banks-Baldwin 1989).
Indiana's law prohibits the acquiror of twenty percent or more of the target's shares from voting those shares unless a
majority of noninterested shareholders grant the acquiror voting rights. See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-9 (Michie 1989). Indi-
ana's law requires additional noninterested shareholder votes when the acquiror attains over one-third and one-half, respectively,
of the total target's voting power. Upon filing an "acquiring person statement" with the target, the acquiror may request that a
vote be held within fifty days. Upon failing to gamer adequate shareholder votes, the target may redeem the acquiror's shares at
fair market value; if acquirors prevail in the vote and subsequently acquire a majority of the shares, dissenting shareholders may
elect to be cashed out at the highest price per share paid by the acquiror in her control share acquisition. See id.
72. See, e.g., id. § 23-1-42-5 (directors may unilaterally amend bylaws, thereupon controlling election to opt in/out).
73. See, e.g., id. § 23-142-7(b).
74. See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-2(d)(5) (Michie 1989) (acquisition of shares not deemed a control share acquisition
if pursuant to a plan of merger or plan share exchange).
75. See. e.g., MINN. STAT. § 302A.011 (38)(e) (1990) (exempting shares issued directly by the target corporation from
the statute's coverage); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.671 reporter's notes (West 1985).
76. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 110 D, § I(c)(2Xvi) (1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 13-1-728.1(6) (Michie 1988).
77. Cf Allen Boyer, When it Comes to Hostile Tender Offers, Just Say No: Commerce Clause and Corporation Law in
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 57 U. CiN. L. REV. 539 (1988). Boyer hails control share statutes as empowering
shareholders to defeat or accept hostile offers, arguing that the ultimate effect of control share statutes is to give shareholders a
voice, provide a mechanism for making this voice heard, and expand shareholders' role in corporate governance. See id.
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control share acquisition statutes impose significant delays that may prove
lethal to would-be suitors by increasing risks.79 As a result, potential acquir-
ers will be "extremely reluctant to acquire stock above any of the [statutory]
thresholds" lest they become permanently disenfranchised. 0
Legislatures often enact these and other types of antitakeover statutes
hastily." As suggested by the character and pervasiveness of the recent
waves of antitakeover legislation,82 legislators do not consider shareholders
a favored constituency. Since shareholders are rarely concentrated locally,
their interests are systematically under-represented.83 Further, since the
expected gains of local nonshareholder antitakeover forces generally exceed
those of resident shareholders, nonshareholders have far more incentive to
direct resources toward supporting antitakeover legislation."
What motivates states to enact antitakeover legislation? Wary of raid-
ers' tendencies to liquidate companies, close plants, and lay off workers,
state legislators seek to protect home-based businesses.85 More specifically,
the impetus likely derives from two sources: the enacting state's desire to
protect nonshareholder constituencies, 6 including managers who are unable
78. These statutes were believed to be pro-shareholder to the extent that they allow shareholders to vote collectively.
thereby mitigating coercion:
If, for example, shareholders believe that a successful tender offer will be followed by a purchase of
non-tendering shares at a depressed price, individual shareholders may tender their shares - even if
they doubt the tender offer is in the corporation's best interest - to protect themselves from being
forced to sell their shares at a depressed price .... [Thus], the shareholders as a group, acting in the
corporation's best interest, could reject the offer, although individual shareholders might be inclined
to accept it.
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 83 (1987) (citation omitted).
79. "Delay has been characterized as 'the most potent weapon in a tender-offer fight.' Edgar, 457 U.S. at 637 n.12
(citing Langervoort, State Tender Offer Legislation: Interests, Effects, and Political Competency, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 213, 238
(1977); Herbert M. Wachtell, Special Tender Offer Litigation Tactics, 32 Bus. LAW. 1433, 1437-42 (1977); Diane Wilner &
Craig A. Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and Their Constitutionality, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1. 9-10 (1976)).
80. Thomas J. Andre, A Preliminary Inquiry Into the Utility of Vote Buying in the Market for Corporate Control, 63 S.
CAL. L. REv. 533, 554 (1990). Cf CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 95, 97 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Whether the control shares statute 'pro-
tects shareholders of Indiana corporations' or protects incumbent management seems to me a highly debatable question .... But
a law can be both economic folly and constitutional."). Indeed, Judge Posner considered these ex ante deterrences so powerful as
to decry Indiana's statute as a "lethal dose" for hostile takeovers. See Dynamics Corp. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 262-63 (7th
Cir. 1986), rev d. in part. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
81. See P. John Kozyris, The Federal Role in Corporate Takeovers: a Framework for a Limited Second Congressional
Intervention to Protect the Free Market, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 263, 263 (1990) (arguing that despite the "unprecedented" transfer of
power from the shareholders to management, antitakeover legislation is "enacted without any substantive debate").
82. I have previously stated:
[A]ntitakeover statutes have been enacted in three waves. First-generation statutes were enacted in
response to the spell of takeover activity in the late 1960s, and often paralleled the requirements of the
Williams Act. Second-generation statutes were passed in response to the Supreme Court's rejection of
first-generation statutes announced in Edgar v. MITE Corp. Third-generation statutes are those that
have been passed since CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, where the Supreme Court upheld
Indiana's second- generation statute.
Matheson & Olson. supra note 10 at 1438-49 (footnotes omitted).
83. See Macey, supra note 57, at 488-89.
84. See Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Epilogue: The Role of the Hostile Takeover and the Role of the States, 1988 WIs. L.
(Ev. 491, 501. Professor Davis notes that "because the activities of the antitakeover interests tend to be more local, these inter-
ests are more likely to be well-organized at the state level. Labor unions and municipalities typically have statewide associations;
institutional investors do not." Id.
85. See Alan E. Garfield. Evaluating State Anti-takeover Legislation: A Broadminded New Approach to Corporation
Law or "A Race to the Bottom?," 1990 COLUM. Bus. L. Rav. 119, 126. Cf. Macey, supra note 57, at 476 ("Managerial self-inter-
est remains the sole explanation for state anti-takeover legislation."). Garfield explains:
[a] study of takeover statutes suggests that these statutes are not employee protective but management
protective. By attempting to stop takeovers, the statutes serve only one purpose: to entrench current
management in power. Nothing in the legislation ties the hands of current managers from engaging in
the same dislocative conduct attributed to acquirors. The legislators are simply hoping that by pro-
tecting current managers, they will perpetuate current management policies, including the current
deployment of corporate assets and jobs.
Garfield, supra, at 126.
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or unwilling to persuade shareholders of the value of internal defensive mea-
sures, 87 and financial protectionism, where states desire to retain and maxi-
mize tax-generating resources.88
E. The Post-Insulation Dynamic
A series of four significant developments, each separately addressed in
Parts III through VI, have either solidified corporate governance or are lead-
ing it out of the insulated managerialism era. The first is the protection
given to boards of directors in control transactions and the empowerment of
target company boards to deal with hostile tender offers. Empowerment
may be meaningless without the tools appropriate to the successful exercise
of the new-found power. Thus, the second development in the transition to
the current stage of corporate governance is the creation and perfection of
the ultimate antitakeover device, the poison pill. These two developments
nearly served to give the board of directors of publicly traded companies a
strangle hold on corporate governance.
However, as reviewed previously, at least in the corporate context, the
enhancement of power usually begets a powerful response. That is, because
of the extreme power that was reposed in boards of directors of publicly
traded companies, a dialectical response was inevitable. In this context the
response had two parts. First, the growth and aggressiveness of the institu-
tional investor served notice on incumbent management that a battle was
brewing. Second, fueled by institutional shareholder activism, a series of
significant court decisions limited the effectiveness of the poison pill and
thereby opened the way for a new era of corporate governance.
III. THE ROLE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS IN CONTROL
TRANSACTIONS
A. The Board's Role as Gatekeeper in Traditional Control Transactions
The most salient legal and economic characteristic of corporate gover-
nance is the concentration of decision-making authority in the board. The
corporate board is the focal point of the corporation: management's role is
derivative of the board's -- the shareholders' role is reactive. 9 By centraliz-
86. More than half of the states have adopted provisions that expressly allow directors to consider nonshareholder inter-
ests in responding to takeover bids. See Matheson & Olson, supra note 10, at 1500-01, 1538 (identifying twenty-nine states that
have enacted some form of these statutes).
87. State antitakeover legislation is often adopted at the request of potential target corporations reluctant to propose the
defenses embodied in the statutes. See id. at 1501.
88. Justice Powell has stated:
The corporate headquarters of the great national and multinational corporations tend to be located in
the large cities of a few States. When corporate headquarters are transferred out of a city and State
into one of these metropolitan centers, the State and locality from which the transfer is made inevita-
bly suffer significantly. Management personnel-many of whom have provided community leader-
ship-may move to the new corporate headquarters. Contributions to cultural, charitable, and
educational life-both in terms of leadership and financial support-also tend to diminish when there is a
move of corporate headquarters.
Edgar, 457 U.S. at 646 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
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ing corporate authority and information processing in the board while grant-
ing shareholders merely a passive, reactive role, corporate law seeks to
minimize the costs of corporate decision making.The corporate board has historically played, and still plays today, a pri-
mary role in most corporate events. Significant corporate transactions, such
as a merger or sale of assets, typically require board recommendation before
being considered by the shareholders, so that the board has the ability to
short-circuit such fundamental changes. Or, from a different perspective,
the shareholders are not burdened with such important decisions unless their
duly-elected representatives have first carefully considered the matter and
decided it is in the interests of the corporation and the shareholders. Simi-
larly, changes in the corporate charter are typically initiated by the directors.
Even when statutes require shareholder approval of certain board actions,
such as amendments to the articles of incorporation or fundamental corpo-
rate reorganizations, usually the board must first approve the proposal.90
Shareholders may only vote when directors present them with matters; they
may not amend board proposals.
The board of directors, then, acts as a gatekeeper with respect to signif-
icant corporate transactions. No proposal gets through the gate to the share-
holders unless the board approves it first. Indeed, the only significant source
of shareholder power over the board is the right to replace board members.
Even as to that prerogative, the current members of the board of directors,
through a nominating committee or in response to management's proposals,
almost always choose whether to continue in office or else decide who will
replace them. At least historically, shareholders rarely have had the inclina-
tion or ability to exercise the option of changing the composition of the
board of directors.
B. The Hostile Tender Offer as a Non-Corporate Transaction
However, one significant transaction, the tender offer,91 need not
89. This board-centered corporate govemance system accords well with Kenneth Arrow's "authority" model. See KEN-
NETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION (1974). Arrow's model has twin foci: individuals' incentives and individuals'
control over information. See id. at 69-70. Given identical information and incentives, each member of an organization will reach
decisions by "consensus" because each member voting in her own self-interest will be motivated to select the outcome preferred
by others. See id. at 69. Given divergent information and incentives, it is infeasible for all members to partake actively in the deci-
sion-making process; individual members lack both the information and incentives to arrive at optimal group decisions. See Id. at
70. It is thus cheaper and more efficient to process information centrally. See ARROW, supra, at 70.
90. See. e.g.. MODEL BUS. CORP. AcT §§ 10.03(b) (1991) (prior board approval for amendments to the articles of incor-
poration); § I 1.03(b) (same for mergers); § 12.02(b) (same for sale of substantially all corporate assets); § 14.02(b) (same for vol-
untary dissolution of corporation) (1997).
91. No consensus exists as to the definition of a tender offer. Courts consider eight factors proposed by the SEC in
determining the existence of a tender offer:
(1) Active and widespread solicitation of public shareholders for the shares of an issuer; (2) solicita-
tion made for a substantial percentage of the issuer's stock; (3) offer to purchase made at a premium
over the prevailing market price; (4) terms of the offer are firm rather than negotiable; (5) offer con-
tingent on the tender of a fixed number of shares, often subject to a fixed maximum number to be pur-
chased; (6) offer open only for a limited period of time; (7) offeree subjected to pressure to sell his
stock; [and (8)] public announcements of a purchasing program concerning the target company pre-
cede or accompany rapid accumulation of a large amount of target company's securities.
S.E.C. v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc.. 760 F.2d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp.783,
823-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'don other grounds, 682 F.2d 355 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983)).
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involve the current management or the board of directors. In a tender offer,
shareholders are given the opportunity to sell their shares directly to an off-
eror and thereby to relinquish their interest in the corporation. No board
approval is necessary. 92 No shareholder vote is taken. The tender offer trans-
action is fundamentally financial, not corporate. Yet, if the offer is for a
controlling number of shares, ultimate corporate control may shift.93 There-
fore, the ease by which a tender offer may shift the fundamental ownership
of a company embodies the whole concept of the market for corporate con-
trol.94
Prior to the 1968 enactment of the Williams Act, tender offers typically
followed this scenario:
The prospective buyer offers a price far enough above the market
to obtain the desired number of shares -- usually an amount suffi-
cient to gain operating control of the corporation. As an aid in car-
rying out his objective the buyer generally hires a brokerage house
to manage the offer, arranges a loan to pay for the purchase, buys a
few newspaper ads and issues press releases to shareholders of the
"target" company. If the number of shares tendered by sharehold-
ers falls below the number desired, then all the shares are returned
and the acquisition plan is canceled. If the tender offer brings in
more stock than the specified number... bid for, the offeror may
at his option buy only the number of shares for which he has bid or
may buy all of the stock tendered. 95
92. See Rule 14d-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-9 (1997). While Rule 14d-9 applies to recommendations made by the target
company, Rule 14e-2 provides that the target company must, within ten business days from the dissemination of the tender offer.
make a statement to its shareholders declaring that it (1) recommends acceptance of the offer; (2) recommends rejection of the
offer; (3) is remaining neutral; or (4) is unable to take a position. See id. § 240.14e-2. Thus, Rule 14e-2 requires the target's board
of directors to consider and respond to all tender offers, although its response may be noncommittal.
93. In enacting antitakeover legislation effective October 3 1, 1989, Ohio's General Assembly stressed its concern for
the role of tender offers in transfers of control of Ohio corporations:
(1) Existing Ohio corporate law was designed to deal with traditional methods oftransfer of control of
Ohio corporations. The tender offer has evolved as an alternative device to acquire control of a public
corporation that has been in widespread use in the past several decades .... Numerous Ohio corpora-
tions have been the subject of tender offers and accumulations of significant blocks of securities.
(2) The accumulation of a large block of a corporation's voting shares.., has not been subject to the
normal corporate approval mechanisms involved in other typical types [sic] of acquisition transac-
tions such as mergers, consolidations, combinations, and majority share acquisitions. Such accumula-
tions, however, can result in shifts of effective corporate control and hence, from a business and
financial perspective, directly or indirectly, can result in significant changes in a variety of basic cor-
porate circumstances identical or substantially similar to those arising as a result of the above-men-
tioned transactions. For instance, a change in corporate control accompanying a large accumulation
of shares will very often result in a fundamental change in the ongoing business of the corporation and
a concomitant fundamental change in the nature of the shareholders' investment in it. Thus the poten-
tial that such changes in corporate circumstances will occur gives rise to basic issues concerning the
internal affairs of the corporation typical of those arising in mergers, consolidations, combinations.
and majority share acquisitions. The form of the transaction in which such issues arise should not
alter the basic corporate mechanisms by which such issues are presented and resolved.
(3) Tender offers almost always involve a change in corporate control and, therefore, give rise to these
same basic issues concerning internal corporate affairs ....
OHto REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.832 (Banks-BAldwin 1989) (legislative findings and statement of purposes; tender offers).
94. See generally John H. Matheson & Jon R. Norberg, Hostile Share Acquisitions and Corporate Governance: a
Framework for Evaluating Antitakeover Activities, 47 U. PIT. L. REv. 407 (1987). "It is impossible to overstate how deeply the
market for corporate control has changed the attitudes and practices of U.S. managers .... [That market represents the most
effective check on management autonomy ever devised." Alfred Rappaport, The Staying Power oftthe Public Corporation, HAIM.
Bus. REv., Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 96, 100.
95. 113 CONG. REC. 855 (daily ed. 1967) (statement of Sen. Williams).
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Historically, the unregulated cash tender offer possessed at least three
advantages over other modes of corporate control acquisition. While proxy
contests and stock-for-stock exchanges required disclosure of certain perti-
nent information to the SEC and target company shareholders, 96 cash tender
offers could be made in secrecy. 97 Cash tender offers also took less time to
complete. In addition, because of the lack of regulations, cash tender offers
were administratively less expensive. Finally, the advantages that tender
offers provided to takeover strategists were offset, it was argued, by disad-
vantages to the shareholders of target companies. The lack of disclosure
requirements forced shareholders to make hasty decisions, often with a
dearth of information, about whether to tender their shares or wait out the
offer.98
Congress passed the Williams Act in response to its recognition that, as
a control mechanism, the end results of cash tender offers often paralleled
the results of regulated proxy contests, and to counteract the perceived ineq-
uities of unregulated cash tender offers.99 The Act was designed to protect
investors from sudden shifts in control brought on by an acquirer's swift
accumulation of shares. It requires, in the context of tender offers, full dis-
closure and equal treatment towards target company shareholders similar to
that required in proxy contests and stock for stock exchanges. I°° The Act
ensures that investors are furnished with more time to make informed and
rational decisions without undue pressure. The drafters of the Act, however,
sought to avoid tipping the balance of power in favor of either the offeror or
target company management.101
The passage of the Williams Act did little to prevent hostile takeovers.
The Act interposed a period of delay and some expense, but did not other-
wise limit the offeror's ability to proceed. Management continued to be
bypassed in the process of transfer of shares in the market for corporate con-
trol. Despite the Williams Act, by the middle of the 1970s the takeover
boom had begun an extended expansion that would carry through the mega-
mergers of the late 1980s.102
Corporate management, however, did not remain passive. Various
defensive mechanisms were employed or adopted. From crude beginnings,
such as asset sales or defensive acquisitions, to charter amendments to the
mid- 1980s development of the poison pill, management resisted unfriendly
96. Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 governs proxy solicitation and requires the solicitor to dis-
close information to the target company shareholders and the Commission. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1998). A stock for stock
exchange is a "sale" subject to the registration and prospectus delivery requirements of the Securities Act of 1933. See 15 U.S.C
§§ 77(b)(3) (1994).
97. Prior to the enactment of the Williams Act, the only regulation addressing securities purchases was the Holding
Company and Investment Company Acts. See Holding Co. Act §§ 9.10; Inv. Co. Act §23(c).
98. See generally D. Roger Glenn, Rethinking the Regulation of Open Market and Privately Negotiated Stock Transac-
tions Under the Securities Exchange Act ofl934,8 J. CORP. L. 41 (1982).
99. See The Williams Act, PUB. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
100. SeeH.R. REP. No.90-1711, at2811 (1968).
101. See id.
102. See generally J. MADRICK, TAKING AMERICA: How WE GOT FROM THE FIRST HOSTILE TAKEOVER TO MEGA-
MERGERS, CORPORATE RAIDING AND SCANDAL (1987).
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overtures. The short term goal of such defensive tactics was often to defeat
a particular bid. Many early bids were seen not only as threatening to man-
agement, but also as harmful to shareholders. Bids were purportedly made
at inadequate prices, were designed to result in a bust-up of the operating
entity, or sought to pay a premium for minimal control shares and then
squeeze out the remaining shareholders at a much lower price. The funda-
mental objective of antitakeover measures has always been to reassert the
board's position as primary decision maker in relation to fundamental cor-
porate transactions. 13 The transfer of shares in a tender offer always threat-
ens the continuity of management's control. Management seeks to manage
the process of these share transfers so as to determine, if not defeat, the
transfer of corporate control.
While boards responded to hostile overtures' with whatever defensive
tactics were available, two questions lingered. First, did the board of a target
company have the right to insert itself into what was otherwise a non-corpo-
rate transaction, namely, a hostile tender offer? That is, does the board per-
form the same gatekeeper function with respect to tender offers that it
performs in connection with mergers, sales of assets, article amendments,
and other fundamental corporate transactions? Second, even if the board
had a role in these transactions, how could a board justify attempting to
defeat an offer that would give shareholders a significant premium on their
investment, if indeed the fundamental goal of the board is to run the com-
pany so as to make the most money possible for the shareholders?
C. Empowering the Board of Directors to Deal with Hostile Tender Offers
1. The Power and Obligation to Respond
The board of directors is accepted as the policy-making organ of the
corporation. 104 The directors' presumed expertise and familiarity with the
corporation's business affairs best enables them to make business decisions
that maximize the shareholders' welfare. 05 From this starting point, a judi-
cially created rule has developed that the majority of directors should have
the right to determine the business policy of the corporation, free from judi-
cial second-guessing, so long as they act in good faith and without conflict
103. See Gregg H. Kanter, Judicial Review of Antitakeover Devicer Employed in the Noncoercive Tender Offer Context:
Making Sense of the "Unocal" Test. 138 U. PENN. L. R. 225, 226 (1989) ("rhe ability to enact an antitakeover device, or redeem
an existing one, has granted to the target board a virtual veto power over tender offerors.'). Kanter firther notes that antitakeover
devices enable targets "in effect to defeat any unsolicited tender offer not approved by its board." Id. at 230. See also Conflicting
Claims Remain an Issue in Delaware Cases. NAT'L L. J., Feb. 20, 1989. at S14.
104. See. e.g.. MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. § 8.01 (3d ed. 1985) ("All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under
the authority of. and the business and affairs of the corporation managed under the direction of, its board of directors, subject to
any limitation set forth in the articles of incorporation.').
105. See United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co.. 244 U.S. 261. 263-64(1917) ("Courta interfere seldom to
control such discretion intra vires the corporation"); Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.. 507 F.2d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1974) ("[T]he
sound business judgment rule... expresses the unanimous decision of American courts to eschew intervention in corporate deci-
sion-making'); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado. 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981) ("[]he 'business judgment' rule evolved to give rec-
ognition and deference to directors' business expertise when exercising their managerial power"); Selheimer v. Manganese Corp.,
224 A.2d 634, 644 (Penn. 1966) ("[C]ourts are reluctant to interfere in the internal management of a corporation, since that is a
matter for the discretion and judgment of the directors and shareholders').
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of interest or breach of trust.06
It is not surprising that, early on, courts charged with reviewing anti-
takeover activities began their-inquiry from this same perspective. 107 Panter
v. Marshall Field & Co.18 exemplifies the solidification of the business
judgment rule in cases involving management responses to perceived take-
over threats. In Panter, Marshall Field was approached, as it had been in the
past, concerning its interest in a merger. Marshall Field was publicly traded
and its management previously had pursued a course that avoided combina-
tion with other entities. When Carter Hawley Hale (CHH) made a tender
offer, Marshall Field once again was determined to remain independent. To
carry out its objective, Field first made acquisitions that were designed to
cause antitrust problems for CHH and then sued to enjoin the tender offer
because it would result in violations of the antitrust laws.
The court's focus in Panter was on the initial decision of the board to
fight the offer. The means used, the purchase of additional retail outlets, and
the initiation of legal proceedings were actions that generally are recognized
as being safely within the discretion of a company's board of directors. 1 9
The plaintiff, however, attacked the use of these otherwise accepted powers
in the context of a control struggle. The Seventh Circuit predictably held that
the "desire to build value within the company, and the belief that such value
might be diminished by a given offer is a rational business purpose."' 0l
A significant shift in antitakeover activities, however, occurred after
Panter. The means adopted by a board of directors to retain its control of a
target corporation became increasingly potent and discriminatory in effect,
causing disparities in treatment of otherwise similarly situated shareholders.
In addition, the means employed by target management to prevent or resist
takeover consideration focused more on limiting shareholder discretion,
whereby a board attempts to create a regime of corporate barriers and board
prerogatives so that incumbent management has plenary power to approve
all changes in corporate ownership and control.
The fundamental issue of the board's role in hostile transactions still
106. See, e.g., Regenstein v. J. Regenstein Co.. 97 S.E.2d 693,695 (Ga. 1957) ("No principle of law is more firmly fixed
in o jurisprudence than the one which declares that the courts will not interfere in matters involving merely the judgment of the
majority in exercising control over corporate affairs."); Neidert v. Neidert, 637 S.W.2d 296, 301 (Mo. Ct, App. 1982) ("[W]here
the matter under consideration is one that calls for the business judgment of a board of directors or of the majority shareholders
and if this judgment is exercised fairly and honestly courts will not interfere.").
107. An early federal appellate court decision highlights the strength of this premise. Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d
287 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied. 450 U.S. 999 (198 1), involved a battle for control of a closely held corporation where a challenge
was made to the proposed sale of new shares to someone loyal to the majority owners. The analysis of the Third Circuit in
upholding the sale was predictable and correct. With the issue framed as one of motivation, the court relied on the well-worn and
clearly applicable proposition that "directors ofa corporation are presumed to exercise their business judgment in the best interest
of the corporation." Trueblood, 629 F.2d at 292. Further. the court rejected as unworkable and ill-advised plaintiffs' claim that
any motivation to retain control served to rebut this presumption. "Yet by the very nature of corporate life a director has a certain
amount of self-interest in everything he does. The very fact that the director wants to enhance corporate profits is in part attribut-
able to his desire to keep shareholders satisfied so that they will not oust him." Id. In short, unless a challenger demonstrates "that
the sole or primary motive of the defendant was to retain control," the presumption of proper motivation afforded by the business
judgment rule applies. Id. at 292-93. See also Franz fg. Co. v. EAC Indus. Inc.. [current] F. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,405 (Del.
Dec. 5, 1985) (purchase ofauthorized but unissued shares by target board-created employee stock ownership plan after insurgents
had gained majority control held ineffective when opposed by new majority).
108. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
109. See Id. at 297-98.
110. Id.at296.
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remained. Does the board act as a gatekeeper with respect to hostile tender
offers, or is this a form of a non-corporate transaction with respect to which
the board should remain passive and watch from the sidelines while the mar-
ket determines the fate of the enterprise? If any doubt existed over whether
the target company board had a proper role in attempting to defeat a pre-
sumptively non-corporate transaction, a hostile tender offer, that issue was
put to rest by the Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petro-
leum Co. I IIn Unocal the court addressed the defensive maneuvers taken by
Unocal in response to a tender offer by Mesa. Mesa sought fifty-one percent
of Unocal's shares and was willing to pay fifty-four dollars per share. Uno-
cal responded by making its own tender at seventy-two dollars per share. By
its terms, however, this self-tender excluded Mesa and all of its affiliates
from participation.
Initially, the Delaware Chancery Court granted a temporary restraining
order against Unocal's self-tender offer. "' As Mesa presented the case, the
propriety of Unocal's decision to fight Mesa was properly separated from
the validity of the means employed to wage the battle. "Mesa does not dis-
pute the bona fides of Unocal's decision to oppose its tender offer. However,
Mesa contends that the business judgment rule has no application in decid-
ing the validity of the defensive technique chosen by Unocal.""' Rather,
Mesa contended, and the chancery court found, that discrimination among
shareholders must be justified by a showing that the exclusion was fair to all
concerned. As determined by the chancery court, such discrimination could
not be upheld solely because it involved a battle for control. "In other
words, legally or equitably impermissible conduct cannot be justified by the
fact that it was motivated by a proper purpose."" 14 The end sought by Unocal
did not necessarily justify the means it used to achieve that end.
The Delaware Supreme Court approached the case differently, how-
ever. Initially, the court highlighted the fundamental issue of whether a tar-
get company board has the authority to inject itself between the shareholders
and a party willing to purchase shares from those shareholders in a tender
offer:
We begin with the basic issue of the power of a board of directors of a
Delaware corporation to adopt a defensive measure of this type. Absent
such authority, all other questions are moot. Neither issues of fairness nor
business judgment are pertinent without the underpinning of a board's legal
power to act."5
At this point the court spoke about the general, broad scope of board
I 11. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). Unocal is most often cited for its statement of the two-prong test for determining the
validity of antitakeover measures. As discussed in the text, two other issues addressed by Unocal were even more significant to
the fundamental corporate governance landscape.
112. See Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Unocal Corp., No. 7997, slip op. at 6 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 1985), rev 'd, Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
113. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 953.
114. Mesa Petroleum, No. 7997, slip op. at 7.
115. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 953.
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authority and the specific power of the board to authorize a repurchase of
company shares, even in a discriminatory manner. However, finally
addressing the issue directly and citing the explicit statutory role of the
board as gatekeeper in other fundamental corporate transactions, the Dela-
ware Supreme Court predictably found authority for the board to act:
[T]he board's power to act derives from its fundamental duty and
obligation to protect the corporate enterprise, which includes
stockholders, from harm reasonably perceived, irrespective of its
source .... Thus, we are satisfied that in the broad context of cor-
porate governance, including issues of fundamental corporate
change, a board of directors is not a passive instrumentality.
When a board addresses a pending takeover bid it has an obliga-
tion to determine whether the offer is in the best interests of the
corporation and its shareholders. In that respect a board's duty is
no different from any other responsibility it shoulders, and its
decisions should be no less entitled to the respect they otherwise
would be accorded in the realm of business judgment."6
With this single passage, the general issue of target board authority to act to
defeat a hostile tender offer was resolved. Indeed, in the manner phrased by
the Delaware Supreme Court, target directors not only had the "authority" to
review the tender offer and act appropriately, but moreover it was their
"duty" to do so. If this duty was not met, the directors presumptively could
be held liable. Still, with most tenders coming to the shareholders at a sub-
stantial premium over current market price, and with the target company
board charged with determining if such a premium offer is in the best inter-
ests of the company and its shareholders, how could the board justify pre-
venting the shareholders from accepting the tender offer?
2. Consideration of Stakeholder Interests
If the board is charged with consideration of "the best interests of the
corporation,""' 7 a phrase common to corporate statutes and decisions defin-
116. Id.at 954.
117. For example, the Delaware Chancery court in TW Services, Inc. v. SWT Acquisition, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,334, at 92,147 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989), equated "shareholder longtenn interests" with "multi-constitu-
ency interests:"
The knowledgeable reader will recognize that this particular phrase masks the most fundamental
issue: to what interest does the board look in resolving conflicts between interests in the corporation
that may be characterized as "shareholder longterm interests" or "corporate entity interests" or
"multi-constituency interests" on the one hand, and interests that may be characterized as "share-
holder short term interests" or "current share value interests" on the other?
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ing a director's duty of care, what factors are properly a part of that calcu-
lus? Some commentators argued that a corporation has an "independent
interest in its own longterm business success.""'  In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., ll9 however, the Delaware Supreme Court first directly
endorsed directors' consideration of nonshareholder constituencies:
If a defensive measure is to come within the ambit of the business judg-
ment rule, it must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed. This entails
an analysis by the directors of the nature of the takeover bid and its effect on
the corporate enterprise. Examples of such concerns may include: inade-
quacy of the price offered, nature and timing of the offer, questions of ille-
gality, the impact on "constitutencies" other than shareholders (i.e.,
creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community gener-
ally), the risk of nonconsummation, and the quality of securities being
offered in the exchange. 120
Since the 1985 decision, at least twenty-nine states have enacted legis-
lation allowing directors to consider nonshareholder constituencies. 121 Typi-
cally, these multi-constituency statutes explicitly allow directors to consider
nonshareholder interests. One such statute, passed in Minnesota, provides in
pertinent part:
[A] director may, in considering the best interests of the corpora-
tion, consider the interests of the corporation's employees, cus-
tomers, suppliers, and creditors, the economy of the state and
nation, community and societal considerations, and the long-term
as well as short-term interests of the corporation and its sharehold-
ers including the possibility that these interests may be best served
by the continued independence of the corporation. 122
To their credit, the multiple constituency statutes are consistent with a the-
ory of corporate law positing that a corporation is essentially a "nexus of
contracts" in which numerous constituencies contract with the corporation
for protection and gain. Corporate control is shared among numerous corpo-
rate constituencies; shareholders thus comprise only one component of this
nexus. This theory is based on the assumption that the firm is but a legal fic-
118. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note II, at 202. Lipton and Rosenblum explain:
The greater the amount of goods or services the enterprise can sell, and the greater the difference
between what the consumer is willing to pay and what the goods or services cost to produce, the
greater the profit that inures to the enterprise. Viewed in this light, the corporate enterprise has an
independent interest of its own in the successful operation of its business, with success measured in
terms of present and expected profit.
Id. at 203.
119. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
120. Id. at 955 (emphasis in original). Unocal illustrates the degree to which the business judgment rule may be wielded
to expand the already broad scope of a director's discretion to bypass shareholder input. Thus, the business judgment rule in the
takeover context may allow stakeholder interests to be furthered at the expense of shareholders. See Matheson & Olson, supra
note 10, at 1455-66 (analyzing protectionist case law).
121. See Matheson & Olson, supra note 10, at 1540-45.
122. MIN. STAT. § 302A.251 (5) (1990). The effect of such legislation is to help shield directors from liability by
expanding the criteria that directors may consider in reaching decisions on behalf of the corporation.
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tion in which parties freely consummate contracts articulating the nature of
their relationships, and management takes on the character of a central con-
tracting agent.'23
This shareholder contract derives from three sources: legislation as
interpreted by the courts, 124 articles of incorporation, and fiduciary duties.'25
Unlike statutory standard terms, fiduciary duties embody ex post evaluation
of decisions rather than defining the scope of directors' powers beforehand.
As such, fiduciary duties fill gaps left by standard contract terms. State stat-
utes provide that most contractual terms may be amended -- typically by
majority shareholder vote. 26 Shareholders initially investing in a corpora-
tion implicitly agree to abide by majority-approved provisions. A threshold
inquiry into the province of corporate law thus involves examining the
extent to which governance terms should be determined contractually.
Shareholder primacy advocates argue that board consideration of non-
shareholder interests breeds inefficiency by distorting the free-flowing mar-
ket allocation of resources and by promoting arbitrary management
decision-making. 2 ' However, the shareholder primacy model is not unas-
sailable. Shareholders' ownership of stock may not be the equivalent to
ownership of private property: unlike typical private property,' 28 the corpo-
ration is a central productive element of our economy upon which our nation
depends for its vitality.'29 Further, shareholder stock ownership frequently
appears to be merely a residual financial investment -- quite unlike the "use
and enjoyment" interest of the owner of personal property.130
Nevertheless, there are problems in the application of the multiple con-
stituency concept. How are directors to consider these constituencies in con-
junction with the fiduciary duty they owe shareholders? 13' Even during a
takeover, if directors focus primarily on shareholders' best interests, both
shareholders and stakeholders simultaneously benefit, 132 but numerous prob-
123. See Jenson & Meckling, supra note 19, at 310.
124. In this sense, corporate statutes provide standard form contractual terms. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 394
(1991) ("This chapter and all amendments thereof shall be part of the charter or certificate of incorporation of every corpora-
tion.').
125. These duties may derive from either statute or case law. See, e.g., id. § 144 (implied presumption that a transaction
is voidable where director is financially interested).
126. See, e.g., id. § 242(bXI).
127. See Matheson & Olson, supra note 10, at 1482-91 (citing authorities and noting that consideration of nonshare-
holder interests aggravates conflicts of interest that inhere in control change contexts).
128. Lipton and Rosenblum have explained: "To the extent there is an intrinsic nature to the corporation, it is more akin
to that of a citizen, with responsibilities as well as rights, than to that of a piece of private property." Lipton & Rosenblum, supra
note 1I, at 193.
129. See id. at 192.
130. See id. at 193-94 ("Stockholder's intrinsic ownership interest is a financial interest").
131. Until a takeover becomes imminent, directors may consider nonshareholder constituencies in deploying takeover
defenses as long as they also benefit the shareholders. See Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182
(Del. 1986) (citation omitted) (stating that a board may consider nonshareholder constituencies "provided there are rationally
related benefits accruing to stockholders .... However, such concern for non-stockholder interests is inappropriate when an auc-
tion among active bidders is in progress [such that the sole duty is]... to sell it to the highest bidder."). See also TW Servs., Inc.
v. SWT Acquisition (1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,334, at 92,147 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) (noting that
"(w]hen a corporation is in a 'Revlon mode,' legitimate concerns relating to the claims of other constituencies are absent and,
indeed, concerns about the corporation as a distinct entity become attenuated."); Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559
A.2d 1261, 1282 n.29 (Del. 1989) (holding that a board may consider "the impact of both the bid and the potential acquisition on
other constituencies, provided that it beas some reasonable relationship to general shareholder interests"); ABA Comm. on Cor-
porate Laws, Other Constituencies Statutes: Potential For Confusion, 45 BUS. LAW. 2253 (1990) [hereinafter Other Constituen-
cies].
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lems emerge from a stakeholder model in which directors are allowed to
consider stakeholder interests.' 3
First, since a corporation would harm itself by discarding valuable
employees or suppliers, 3 4 the extra protection assists primarily suboptimal
employees, suppliers, or creditors who would be affected by a "shareholder
primacy" approach.' Since most nonshareholders are already protected by
other laws, 36 stakeholder problems resulting from board action under a
shareholder primacy perspective would be short term. 37
Second, requiring accountability to holders of conflicting interests may
ultimately harm both groups. 38 Directors who are free to consider nonshare-
holder interests would be less accountable to shareholders.'9 In addition, the
"standard" by which courts articulate a director's duty to stakeholders defies
precise definition. 140 The undefined parameters of this "standard" fuels
directors' uncertainty regarding their allegiance to shareholders. 141
3. Legislation Limiting Director Accountability
Unocal was actually the second watershed case from the Delaware
132. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role; supra note 12, atI 190-92. Cf Other Constituencies, supra note 13 1,
at 2269 (suggesting that a better interpretation of directors' duties statutes and related case law allows directors to take into
account nonshareholder constituencies, but only "to the extent that the directors are acting in the best interests, long as well as
short term, of the shareholders and the corporation").
133. For an analysis of directors' duty legislation, see Other Constituencies, supra note 13 1, at 2263-70.
134. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role, supra note 12, at 1170-7 1.
135. See id.
136. See Other Constituencies, supra note 131 , at 2268 (discussing how creditors, management, employees, and unions
have other means of protection). See also Gregory R. Andre, Tender Offers for Corporate Control: A Critical Analysis and Pro.
posalsfor Reform, 12 DEL. 1. CORP. L. 865, 884 (1987) (noting that employees are protected by labor laws and stating that legis-
lation "governing hostile takeovers should not attempt to minimize noninvestors' risks at the expense of our free market system").
137. In addition, employees or suppliers are usually only temporarily displaced .. that is, many constituencies have the
capacity to find a replacement for their reliance on the acquired company.
138. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role, supra note 12, at 1192. See also Andre, supra note 136, at 884-85
("[M]anagement should not be asked or allowed to attempt to carry out the impossible task of acting as fiduciaries for groups with
competing interests.'); Ronald J. Gilson, Just Say No to Whom?, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 121, 126 (1990).
139. In the narrowest sense, when directors are free to consider nonshareholder interests in takeover scenarios rather than
focus on the sole objective of maximizing shareholder wealth, their accountability is diminished inasmuch as shareholders can
less easily monitor a manager's performance.
Former SEC chairman Davis S. Ruder has explained that director accountability to a clearly defined group (i.e., share-
holders) is a cornerstone of the corporate system: "If management duties to others are declared, the process of corporate account-
ability will be thrown into disarray." David S. Ruder, Speech to the American Bar Association committee responsible for the
Revised Model Business Corporation Act (Aug. 6, 1990), in ABA Model Act Panel Rejects Other- Constituencies Measures, 22
SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 33,1 1217 (Aug. 17, 1990).
140. Directors' duty legislation affords no guidance on how directors should consider nonshareholder constituencies.
See Dennis J. Block & Yvette Miller, The Responsibilities and Obligations of Corporate Directors in Takeover Contests, I I SEC.
REG. L.J. 44,69 (1983); Matheson & Olson, supra note 10, at 1538-45.
141.
The issue thus becomes whether director duties statutes constitute an efficient and desirable way to
provide protections for nonshareholder groups. The Committee has concluded that permitting - much
less requiring - directors to consider these interests without relating such consideration in an appro-
priate fashion to shareholder welfare (as the Delaware courts have done) would conflict with direc-
tors' responsibility to shareholders and could undermine the effectiveness of the system that has made
the corporation an efficient device for the creation ofjobs and wealth.
The Committee believes that the better interpretation of these statutes, and one that avoids such con-
sequences, is that they confirm what the common law has been: directors may take into account the
interests of other constituencies but only as and to the extent that the directors are acting in the best
interests, long as well as short term, of the shareholders and the corporation ....
The confusion of directors in trying to comply with such statutes, if interpreted to require directors to
balance the interests of various constituencies without according primacy to shareholder interests,
would be profoundly troubling .... When directors must not only decide what their duty of loyalty
mandates, but also to whom their duty of loyalty runs (and in what proportions), poorer decisions can
be expected.
Other Constituencies, supra note 13 1, at 2268-69.
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Supreme Court in 1985. The first was Smith v. Van Gorkom,142 in which the
board of directors of a publicly traded corporation was found liable for
breach of the duty of care in approving an acquisition transaction at a sub-
stantial premium above market price. In direct response to the holding in
Van Gorkom, the Delaware legislature enacted section 102(b)(7) of the Del-
aware Corporate Code, which allows firms to opt out of the duty of care
standard.14 1 That section permits companies to amend their articles of incor-
poration to eliminate monetary liability of directors to the corporation and
its shareholders, 144 essentially allowing each firm to adopt its own standard
of fiduciary responsibility. Many other states have enacted similar statutes
and many corporations have included them in, or adopted them as part of,
their articles of incorporation.
In addition, all jurisdictions recognize the power of a corporation,
within specified limits, to indemnify its directors and officers against
expenses and liabilities incurred while carrying out their duties. 145 These
expenses include litigation costs directly resulting from service to the corpo-
ration. 46 Most of these statutes provide for mandatory and permissive
indemnification, depending on the circumstances. Delaware law, for exam-
ple, mandates corporate indemnification for expenses incurred in any pro-
ceeding to the extent the director has been successful. 147 If the director loses,
Delaware law permits indemnification. 14  Corporations may provide for
broader indemnification in their bylaws or articles.
The statutes in every state except Vermont expressly permit corpora-
tions to purchase insurance protecting officers and directors against liability.
For example, the Delaware statute grants corporations the right to purchase
insurance on behalf of any director, officer, employee, or agent of the corpo-
ration for liability arising out of such capacity. 49 Thus, the insurance cover-
age may be broader than indemnity coverage.1 0
IV. THE ULTIMATE DEFENSIVE MECHANISM: THE POISON PILL
A. Design and Effect of the Poison Pill
A third watershed Delaware case, Moran v. Household International,
Inc.,'51 was decided in 1985. Moran involved a defensive device known as a
142. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). In Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the business judgment rule did
not protect the directors of a company who breached their duty of care in approving a proposed cash merger. See id. at 893.
143. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8. § 02(bX7) (199 1); Note, Craig W. Hammond, Limiting Directors' Duty of Care Liabil-
ity: An Analysis ofDelaware's CharterAmendmentApproach 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 543, 548 (1987).
144. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (bX7) (1991).
145. See ALl PROJECT, supra note 14, pt. VII, § 7.20 cmt. a, at 905.
146. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 10-2A-21 (1987 & Supp. 1989).
147. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 145(c) (1991). See also Merrett-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 321 A.2d 138,
141 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974).
148. See DEL CO DE ANN. tit. 8, 145 (a) (1991).
149. See id. § 145(g).
150. See id. § 145(b) (insurance could encompass liability associated with shareholder derivative action even though oth-
erwise limited under Delaware law).
151. 500A.2d 1346(Del. 1985).
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Preferred Share Purchase Rights Plan,'52 or "poison pill." Under the terms
of the Plan, Household shareholders were entitled to one "Right" for every
common share held, with each Right giving the holder the option to pur-
chase a portion of a share of a new preferred class of stock for a set price.
The Rights were not exercisable, however, until either (1) the announcement
of a tender offer for thirty percent or more of Household's shares; or (2) the
acquisition of twenty percent or more of Household's shares by any single
entity or group, that is, a hostile share acquisition.' The Rights were gener-
ally redeemable by Household's board of directors for fifty cents per right,
but they became nonredeemable if anyone actually acquired twenty percent
or more of Household's shares. 14
All of this was basically window dressing, however. The Rights were
not intended to be exercised and the purchase price for the preferred stock
was out of the money. Most importantly, though, the rights contained antid-
ilution provisions which provided that, if a merger or consolidation occurred
between the company and another party in circumstances not approved by
the incumbent board of directors, each holder could exercise the Right and
purchase two hundred dollars of the common stock of the tender offer or
other acquiring entity for one hundred dollars.' This 'antidilution provision
was made effective by providing that the company could not enter into any
merger agreement unless this bargain-purchase benefit was provided to
shareholders. The resulting dilution of the financial interests of the hostile
party would be so great that to cross the pre-determined share acquisition
threshold and ultimately engage in a merger or other acquisition transaction
without target board approval would be financial suicide. Hence, the moni-
ker "poison pill."
Moran is unusual in several respects. First, the Rights Plan was prophy-
lactic in nature, since it was not adopted during a battle for corporate con-
trol. Second, in an unprecedented move, the SEC filed an amicus curiae
brief supporting the challenge to the Plan. 56 Finally, unlike the selective
self-tender offer at issue in Unocal, in Moran the Delaware Supreme Court
was presented with a defensive mechanism which, although adopted by the
board of directors, had fundamental effects on the structure of the corpora-
tion and the separation of functions between the shareholders and the board.
Rejecting arguments to the contrary, the Delaware Supreme Court
upheld the Rights Plan in Moran. Preliminarily, the court turned aside the
claim that the Household board of directors did not have statutory authority
to adopt the Plan.'57 The court then focused on the substantive effect of the
Plan. As phrased by the SEC, "the Rights Plan will deter not only two-tier
offers, but virtually all hostile tender offers."'58 In sum, it was argued that
152. See id. at 1348.
153. See id.
154. See id. at 1349.
155. See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1346.
156. Seeld. at 1348.
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this poison pill made any unapproved merger or consolidation prohibitively
expensive, thus changing Household's fundamental structure by deterring
any substantial hostile share acquisition not approved by the company's
board. The Delaware Supreme Court refuted the claim that no hostile tender
offers would be attempted after the adoption of this Plan by pointing to Sir
James Goldsmith's takeover of Crown Zellerbach Corporation, since Crown
Zellerbach had a poison pill provision similar to the one at issue in Moran. 159
More importantly, however, the court did not view the Rights Plan as
preclusive of all takeovers even if nearly all share acquisitions above the
pre-determined threshold would be deterred:
The evidence at trial also evidenced many methods around the
Plan ranging from tendering with a condition that the Board
redeem the Rights, tendering with a high minimum condition of
shares and Rights, tendering and soliciting consents to remove the
Board and redeem the Rights, to acquiring 50% of the shares and
causing [the company] to self-tender for the Rights. One could
also form a group of up to 19.9% and solicit proxies for consents
to remove the Board and redeem the Rights. 160
As the Delaware Supreme Court well knew, however, each of these
hypothetical "methods around" the Rights Plan were impractical for a vari-
ety of reasons, including the fact that no hostile party would make a signifi-
cant investment in a target company without being guaranteed that the
Rights would be extinguished. That is, tender offers with high minimum or
with a condition of redemption would typically be useless gestures either
because enough shares would be in friendly or sympathetic hands to defeat
the high minimum or the Board would, as discussed below, follow the "just
say no" defense and refuse to redeem the Rights.' 6' The last "method
around" the Rights Plan identified in Moran, the proxy contest, while still
mostly impracticable in the mid- 1980s, would, as discussed in Part V below,
become a realistic option in the mid-1990s.
After Moran, rights plans were refined. Moran involved a flip-over
provision, which would cause suicidal dilution to the hostile party upon
engaging in a second-stage transaction, such as a merger or sale of assets.
Today, almost all rights plans contain a flip-in provision, which dilutes the
hostile acquiring party's interest immediately upon crossing the predeter-
157. Statutory authority for creation of the Plan came from sections 151(g) and 157 of the Delaware General Corporation
Law. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 151(g), 157(1983). The court had some trouble with the fact that the "Rights" were not oper-
ative to purchase Household's shares, but rather to purchase the shares of some as yet unidentified hostile suitor. The court analo-
gized the "Rights" to "anti-destruction" or "anti-dilution" provisions that sometimes accompany corporate securities, finding the
Household "Rights" to be sufficiently like these latter devices to be valid against a hostile suitor. See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1352.
158. Id. at 1354.
159. See id.
160. Id. (emphasis added).
161. See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356-57.
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mined share acquisition threshold, often fifteen percent. Moreover, redemp-
tion of the rights by the incumbent board provides the only realistic means to
avoid the disastrous effects of the flip-in provision, which squarely places
the board in the position of "gatekeeper" to hostile overtures. Not surpris-
ingly, then, no hostile party has ever triggered a flip-in provision.
B. The "Just Say No" Defense and the Issue of Poison Pill Redemption
Since Moran'62 corporate adoptions of shareholder rights plans, or poi-
son pills, have become routine matters that easily survive judicial scrutiny.
Moran opened the door for corporate boards to inject themselves preemp-
tively into the tender offer or control transaction process, thereby presump-
tively requiring incumbent management and director approval as a
necessary step in the change of corporate control. Directors have imple-
mented numerous defensive measures to resist hostile takeover bids, 163
including second-generation poison pills, 164 stock repurchases, golden para-
chutes, 61 lock-up agreements,166 and no-shop provisions.167
Once a poison pill or other mechanism is in place that allows the corpo-
rate board to preempt a direct takeover bid, the exercise by a corporate board
of this power crystallizes the fiduciary issue. The initial analysis of this
issue derives from the fourth watershed case coming from the Delaware
Supreme Court in 1985: Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrew & Forbes Holdings,
Inc. 16 Revlon involved defensive actions of a corporation during a bidding
war between hostile and friendly parties. Under these circumstances, that is,
where a change of control or a break up of the company is inevitable, the
directors' duty is to maximize the economic value to the shareholders result-
162. In Moran the Delaware Supreme Court upheld a board's adoption of a shareholder rights plan. The court stated:
"[P]re-planning for the contingency of a hostile takeover might reduce the risk that, under the pressure of a takeover bid, manage-
ment will fail to exercise reasonable judgment. Therefore, in reviewing a pre-planned defensive mechanism, it seems even more
appropriate to apply the business judgment rule." Id. at 1350. The Moran Chancery Court allowed directors to justify their
actions based on the interests of one or more corporate constituencies. See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1079(Del. Ch. 1985). The Chancery Court stated that poison pills, if implemented "to protect all corporate constituencies and not sim-
ply to retain control, have been consistently approved under the business judgment rule." Id.
163. Consistent with the wide latitude the business judgment rule grants directors, courts have upheld a variety of defen-
sive measures. See, e.g., Gearhat Indus. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 724 (5th Cir. 1984) (deploying "springing warrants");
Enterra Corp. v. SGS Assocs., 600 F. Supp. 678, 688 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (entering into "standstill agreements" whereupon potential
offerors agree not to proceed with offer).
164. A second-generation rights plan contains a flip-in provision whereby any acquisition above a pre-determined
threshold will trigger a bargain purchase of target company shares by every holder except the party crossing the threshold. See
Ronald A. Brown, Jr., Note, An Examination of a Board of Directors' Duty to Redeem the Rights Issued Pursuant to a Stock-
holder Rights Plan, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 537 (1989); Patrick J. Thompson, Note, Shareholder Rights Plans: Shields or Gavels?,
42 VAND. L. REv. 173 (1989).
165. These executive termination agreements are "contracts between corporations and their executive personnel guaran-
teeing generous severance benefits in the event of a corporate takeover." Drew H. Campbell, Note, Golden Parachutes: Common
Sense from the Common Law, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 279, 280 (1990).
166. Lock-up options and bust-up fees involve the right to purchase target stock or assets on favorable terms. Without
these favorable terms, white knights would not likely assist a target. A target corporation board may grant a white knight the
option to purchase key corporate assets, a strategy known as the "crown jewel" defense. See Matheson & Olson, supra note 10, at
1457-58 n.221.
167. White knights often require no-shop covenants by the target preventin8 the target from soliciting or encouraging
anyone to make a competing hid or otherwise assist would-be acquirors. In Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan. Inc., 559 A.2d
1261 (Del. 1989), the Delaware Supreme Court invalidated a no-shop provision, asserting that "[a]bsent a material advantage to
the stockholders from the terms or structure of a bid that is contingent on a no-shop clause, a successful bidder imposing such a
condition must be prepared to survive the careful scrutiny which that concession demands." Id. at 1286. See also Barkan v. Arm-
stad Indus., 567 A.2d 1279, 1288 (Del. 1989) ("Where a board has no reasonable basis upon which to judge the adequacy of a
contemplated transaction, a no-shop restriction gives rise to the inference that the board seeks to forestall competing bids.").
168. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
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ing from the transaction. This may mean that the duty of the directors is to
auction off the corporation and act as neutral auctioneers. Either of two pre-
requisites must be met before Revlon's enhanced responsibilities 69 engage:
(1) the corporation must initiate a bidding process (e.g., it must be for sale or
there must be a bidding contest) or, in response to an offer, the target must
abandon its long term strategy;170 or (2) the breakup of the target corporation
must be "inevitable."171
Revlon resulted in an uproar in corporate boardrooms. Most important
was the issue of when the duty to auction attaches and, conversely, when the
board can stand fast behind its various board-adopted and state-imposed
defensive mechanisms. Although Revlon's potentially clear guidelines have
proven most malleable, 172 the basic teaching of Revlon (and, indeed, of Uno-
cal and Moran) is "simply that [directors] must act in accordance with their
fundamental duties of care and loyalty."' 73
The "just say no" defense 174 is therefore a post-Revlon concept that has
been used as a corporate battle-cry and serves to generalize, distill, and clar-
ify otherwise fact-specific holdings into an ostensibly coherent category of
cases, ultimately decreeing that a board need not abandon its antitakeover
weaponry (e.g., redeem its poison pill or the equivalent) when such surren-
der defeats shareholders' long term interests. The proponents of this theory
have advanced this proposition: a board of directors may "just say no" to a
hopeful suitor when doing so advances the corporation's -- and thus share-
holders'-- best interests. To the extent directors must know under what gen-
eral circumstances they may "just say no," this concept may serve as a
convenient acid test. Although much litigation has focused on target direc-
tors' duties to redeem rights plans, numerous (and various) cases grapple
with a board's ability to consummate corporate restructuring in an effort to
"just say no" to would-be raiders.
169. In Macmillan the Delaware Supreme Court distinguished directors' enhanced "duties" under Unocal and their
increased "responsibilities" under Revlon:
As we held in Revlon, when management ofa target company determines that the company is for sale,
the board's responsibilities under the enhanced Unocal standards are significantly altered. Although
the board's responsibilities under Unocal are far different, the enhanced duties of the directors in
responding to a potential shift in control, recognized in Unocal, remain unchanged. This principle
pervades Revlon, and when directors conclude that an auction is appropriate, the standard by which
their ensuing actions will be judged continues to be the enhanced duty imposed by this Court in Uno-
cal.
Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1287 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
170. See Ivanhoe Partners L.P v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del.1987) (the only bidder for corpora-
tion was T.Boone Pickens' Ivanhoe Partnership, therefore Newmont was not for sale). In Revlon directors had authorized man-
agement to "sell" the corporation. Cf Vlahakis, "Just Say No" Made Easier; Lesions in "Just Saying Yes," in SECURITIES.
REGULATION (Practising Law Institute) No. 713, 331, 333 (1990). Today, directors trigger Revlon duties only where "the board
makes a conscious determination to initiate a sale or abandon its long-term strategy." Id.
171. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
172. See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, What Triggers Revlon?, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 37 (1990).
The authors suggest that the seeds ofRevlon's malleability derive from Revlon's focus on that discrete point at which a sale of tar-
get becomes "inevitable." Id. at 38. The authors note that "management cannot restrict shareholder choice by erecting defensive
tactics or lockups without intermediate level judicial review then substituting for shareholder choice as a check on the fairness of
management's action." Id. at 59.
173. Barkan v. Annsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989) (citation omitted).
174. For a definition and comprehensive analysis of the "just say no" defense, see Robert A. Prentice & John H. Lang-
more, Hostile Tender Offers and the "Nancy Reagan Defense:" May Target Boards "Just Say No?" Should They Be Allowed
To?, 15 DEL. J' CORP. LAw 377 (1990). They define the just say no defense in terms of the nagging question:,"Is it ever permis-
sible for target management to refuse to provide an alternative, yet still oppose the hostile tender offer?" Id. at 382.
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In the leading case illustrating the contours of the "just say no" defense
as it relates to preplanned long term corporate restructuring, Paramount
Communications v. Time, Inc., " ' the Delaware Supreme Court held that,
absent Revlon's limited set of circumstances, a board of directors, while
always required to act in an informed manner, is not under any per se duty to
maximize shareholder value in the short term, even in the context of a take-
over. 76 Although one could argue that Paramount's reach is limited by its
eminently fact-specific holding and, as such, arguably extends only to those
unusual takeover contexts where the target corporation, in that case, Time,
has reached a definitive restructuring plan and has taken all steps necessary
to consummate said plan -- to be sure, the proxies had already been sent to
shareholders -- I"7 the court's broad, general approach 7 8 has added much fuel
to the "just say no" juggernaut. 79 Thus,.commentators tend to discount the
fact-specific focus of Paramount's holding. 180 More generally, Paramount
illustrates that business planning not primarily designed as an antitakeover
scheme' 8' may serve as a preplanning defensive strategy.'
Beyond the use of the "just say no" defense to consummate carefully
negotiated plans like that found in Paramount, the "just say no" defense may
apply:
1. if the offer is coercive,'83 inadequate,8 4 or impaired (e.g., condi-
tioned on merger negotiations);'85
175. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
176. See Id. at 1150.
177. The court itself emphasizes Paramount's unique fact setting:
We have purposely detailed the evidence of the Time board's deliberative approach, beginning in
1983-1984, to expand itself. Time's decision in 1988 to combine with Warner was made only after
what could be fairly characterized as an exhaustive appraisal of Time's future as a corporation ....
Time's board was convinced that Warner would provide the best "fit" for Time to achieve its strategic
objectives. The record attests to the zealousness of Time's executives.., in seeing the preservation
of Time's "culture"....
Id. at 115 1-52.
178. For example, said the court: "Directors are not obliged to abandon a deliberately conceived corporate plan for a
short-term shareholder profit unless there is clearly no basis to sustain the corporate strategy." Id. at 1154 (emphasis added).
Although this is dicta regarding the factual setting of this particular case, such sweeping language demonstrates the court's expan-
sive approach.
179. See P. John Kozyris, The Federal Role in Corporate Takeovers: A Frameworkfor a Limited Second Congressional
Intervention to Protect the Free Market, 51 OHIO ST. LJ. 263, 263 n.3. (1990) (Paramount dealt "the ultimate blow against any
serious judicial control over management oppositionism").
180. See id.
181. Chancellor Allen held that Time had a legitimate "interest" in combining with Warner that may be protected by
defensive action.
In my opinion, where the board has not elected explicitly or implicitly to assume the special burdens
recognized by Revlon, but continues to manage the corporation for long term profit pursuant to a pre-
existing business plan that is not primarily a control device or scheme, the corporation has a legally
cognizable interest in achieving that plan.
Paramount v. Time, Inc.. [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), afid. 571 A.2d
1140 (Del. 1989).
182. The Delaware court in TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 94,334 (Del.Ch.Mar.2, 1989) stated that it is "non-controversial" that:
directors, in managing the business and affairs of the corporation may f'ed it prudent (and are autho-
rized) to make decisions that are expected to promote corporate (and shareholder) long run interests,
even if short run share value can be expected to be negatively affected, and thus directors in pursuit of
long run corporate (and shareholder) value may be sensitive to the claims of other "corporate constit-
uencies.
The recent Polaroid decision also buttresses the use of long term planning as a defensive preplanning strategy. Focusing on long
term corporate goals, the Polaroid court found Polaroid's pre-planned ESOP "entirely fair" despite its highly antitakeover timing
and effect. See Shamrock Holdings, Inc.. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278 (Del. Ch. 1989).
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2. if the board requires time sufficient to consider other alterna-
tives or to otherwise promote shareholder value;186
3. where a raider insists that the target take decisive action (e.g.,
auction the company) upon target's receiving a bare offer'87 or
upon merely negotiating with one bidder; 8 and/or
4. where resisting an offer continues to serve a valid purpose, such
183. Whenever an offeror's coercive or inadequate offer poses a threat to a corporation, courts uphold the defensive
measures as "reasonable in relation to the threat posed." See Shamrock Holdings, Ind., v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278 (Del. Ch.
1989) (finding that an all cash, all shares offer is coercive). For another case upholding a director's decision not to sell the com-
pany based on the coerciveness of the offer, see Desert Partners, L.P. v. USG Corp. 686 F. Supp. 1289 (N.D. Ill. 1988). Applying
Delaware law, the court in Desert Partners approved USG's decision to neither negotiate nor redeem its rights plan amid a hos-
tile, two-tiered offer by Desert Partner. See also Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (partial tender offer);
Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); and Ivanhoe Partners L.P. v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334
(Del. 1987) (two tiered offer). All of these cases involved defenses intended to defeat coercive bids. Q City Capital Assoc., 551
A.2d at 797-98. In that case an all cash tender offer was found to be noncoercive; still, "even where an offer is noncoercive, it may
represent a threat to shareholder interests in the special sense that an active negotiator with power, in effect, to refuse the proposal
may be able to extract a... more valuable proposal, or may be able to arrange an alternative transaction .... " Id.
184. If the board in good faith determines that a bid is inadequate, that alone justifies leaving the pill in place. See
Interco, [1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep (CH) 94,084 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 1988). Still, inadequacy alone may not be
sufficient justification for keeping the pill in place. "Applying the Unocal standards, I am unable to conclude that a board may in
all instances preclude shareholder choice solely on the basis of its own perception of the inadequacy of the offer." Amanda Acqui-
sition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp. 984 (E.D. Wis.), aff'd on other grounds, 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1989) (inade-
quacy as serious threat). See also Facet Enterprise, Inc. v. Prospect Group, Inc., Del. Ch. Civ. Act. No. 9746, Jacobs, U.C. (Apr.
15, 1988):
[A] target board is not required to redeem the rights in the face of a noncoereive all cash tender offer.
Where the board has determined that the offered price is inadequate and has decided to conduct an
auction for the company, it may be appropriate to keep the rights in place in order to allow time for
higher bids to be made.
Id.
For cases involving a combination of (I) inadequacy of cash tender offer for all shares; (2) likelihood of both further
developments and higher shareholder value with retention of rights plan; and (3) no showing of lack of independence in Board's
conduct, see Nomad Acquisition Corp. v. Damon Corp., Fed Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,040 (Del. Ch. Sept. 16, 1988); BNS, Inc. v.
Koppers Co., Inc., 683 F. Supp. 458 (D.Del. 1988); MAI Basic Four, Inc. v. Prime Computer, Inc., Civil Action No. 10428 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 20, 1988).
185. See TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,334, at
92,173 (Del. Ch. Mar.2, 1989) (where tender offer is conditioned on merger negotiations and board has concluded that offer is not
in the long-term interests of the company, the board need neither negotiate nor redeem a rights plan).
186. See Polaroid II, 559 A.2d 278 (Del. Ch. 1989). The Polaroid 11 court suggested that interim defensive measures are
appropriate to allow target corporations sufficient time to explore and present alternatives to shareholders. The Court indicated
that Shamrock's all-cash, all-shares offer would not present a "continuing threat" so as to justify long term defensive measures
absent unusual circumstances (the Polaroid I1 Court held that Polaroid had proven unusual circumstances given Polaroid's patent
infringement litigation against Kodak). See also Doskocil Cos., Inc. v. Griggy, Civil Action. No. 10095, slip op. (Del. Ch., Oct. 7,
1988). The Doskocil court refused to force redemption since the "auction has not yet concluded;" the court held that the target of
a bidding contest could redeem a rights plan for a lower bidder but leave it intact for a higher bidder: "even if the offered price is
not inadequate, it may be appropriate to maintain the rights in order to promote the continuation of the auction." Id.
See also CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (during auction process, poi-
son pills provide directors "with a shield to fend off coercive offers and with a gavel to run an auction."). The Doskocil court also
noted that "when conducting a Revlon auction, the target board may favor one bidder over another 'if in good faith and advisedly
it believes shareholder interests would be thereby advanced."' Doskocil, Civil Action No. 10098, slip opinion (citing In re Fort
Howard Corp. Shareholder Litigation, Del. Ch. Civil Action No. 9991, (Aug. 8, 1988).
187. See, e.g., Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp. 984 (E.D.Wis.). Applying Delaware
law, the court stated that Unocal and its progeny do not require a target to place itself on the auction block. See id. at 1013. In
distinguishing Pillsbury, the court stressed that only twenty-seven percent of Universal's shareholders had tendered (as against
Pillsbury's eighty-seven percent tender); Universal was on an upswing, Pillsbury a downswing; Universal's board had made an
informed decision as to inadequacy of Amanda's offer: Universal's board considered twelve alternative responses to the offers.
See id. at 1013-14. Additional factors the court considered relevant in keeping pill in place: the bid posed a threat to the share-
holders who did not tender if Amanda failed to obtain financing; there was a threat that the offer contained false or misleading
information given Amanda's complex financing. See id. Apparently, Amanda requires that the offer must pose a real threat to
shareholders (and thus the court does not suggest that a target may "just say no" in all circumstances).
188. See Buckhom, Inc., v. Ropak, Corp., 656 F. Supp. 209 (S.D. Ohio 1987), aff'd sum. ord., 815 F.2d 76 (6th Cir.
1987). Applying Delaware law, the court held that Buckom's board had no duty to sell merely because of preliminary negotia-
tions with one potential bidder. See id. See also Ivanhoe Partners L.P. v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del.1987)
(shareholder's entering into a ten year standstill agreement after raising its stake in Newmont to 49.7% (from 26%) did not
amount to a sale of the company requiring Newmont to negotiate with possible bidder (but no bidding contest was yet under-
way)).
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AT THE MILLENNIUM
as fulfilling the target's pre-conceived business plan and promot-
ing long-term shareholder value. 189
Alternatively, the "just say no" defense may be regarded as a means of
distinguishing those cases where target defensive measures fail Unocal's
"reasonable in relation to threat posed" test. 190 In City Capital Associates
Ltd. Partnership v. Interco, Inc.191 the Delaware court forced redemption of
a target's poison pill, finding the threat of injury to target shareholders from
an all-cash offer "mild." '192 In Grand Metropolitan PLC v. Pillsbury Co. 193
the Delaware court stressed that the only threat was to shareholder value and
the "real" threat posed was that of the bid being withdrawn. 194 Courts further
analyze Interco and Pillsbury on the grounds that those decisions came at
the conclusion of takeover battles in which the target was attempting to use
poison pills to protect a board-approved restructuring. 195 However, Para-
mount explicitly rejected Pillsbury's and Interco's implication that an all-
cash, all-shares offer at a reasonable price cannot constitute a "threat" to the
corporation. 196
The "just say no" defense, together with the defensive tool of the poi-
son pill, paved the way for incumbent management of companies to be able
to carry out existing business plans without the risk of having those plans
wrecked by any above-market, all-cash takeover offer. 197 However, the com-
bination of these factors also provided the opportunity for management
entrenchment where no discernible increase in shareholder value appeared
to be on the horizon. These disparate circumstances provided the back-
ground for further evolution of the corporate governance battle.
189. See, e.g.. In re Holly Farms Corp. Shareholders Litig., 564 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1989). In Holly Farms, plaintiff
Tyson and its competitor, ConAgra, were bidding for Holly Farms. The court refused to grant a preliminary injunction requiring
Holly Farms to redeem its rights plan since the pill served the valid purpose ofpreventing Tyson from blocking'ConAgra's eco-
nomically superior offer, leaving shareholders with only Tyson's inferior offer. Since there were no other bidders, the sharehold-
ers would be harmed ifConAgra withdrew its offer, rendering legitimate the unredeemed pill! See id.
190. See, e.g., Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans, [1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed..Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,924 (Del.
Ch. July 14, 1988); City Capital Assocs. Ltd. Partners v. Interco Inc., [1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,084 (Del. Ch. Nov. I, 1988); Grand Metropolitan PLC v. Pillsbury Co., (1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,104 (Del.Ch. Dec. 16, 1988).
191. 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988).
192. See id. at 798.
193. 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988).
194. See id. at 1058.
195. The Delaware Chancery Court in In re Time Inc. Shareholders Litigation, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94.514 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), affd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989) found that Interco and Pillsbury were cases where "manage-
ment was seeking to 'cram down' a transaction that was the functional equivalent of the very leveraged 'bust up' transaction that
management was claiming presented a threat to the corporation." Id. Some courts have suggested that the "just say no" defense
does not apply to cases in which the target's defensive measures amount to restructuring. See TW Services. Inc. v. SWT Acquisi-
tion Corp; [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,334 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989); MAI Basic Four, Inc. v. Prime Computer, Inc.,
[1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. I. Rep. (CCH) 94,179 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 1988).
196. The Paramount court stressed that to accept Paramount's narrow view of the Unocal test would "involve the court
in substituting its judgment for what is a 'better' deal for that of a corporation's board of directors." Paramount. 571 A.2d at
1153. "The [Delaware] [S]upreme [C]ourt rejected the Interco view of Unocal unequivocally and completely ... holding that
there are more threats in the Unocal universe than the Chancery Court had ever dreamed of." Id. The court emphasized this
point, stating that it rejected Interco and its progeny. See id.
197. See, e.g., Moore Corp. Ltd v. Wallace Computer Services, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1545 (D. Del. 1995).
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V; THE RISE OF THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR
A. Increased Shareholdings and the Incentive for Increased Activism
The past several decades have seen a phenomenal concentration of
share ownership in the hands of "institutional investors," including public
and private pension funds and, more recently, mutual funds. As recently as
the early 1980s, these institutional investors owned as little as five percent of
the market value of United States publicly-held corporations. 198
The 1980s and 1990s witnessed a staggering increase in institutional
share ownership with an equally dramatic increase in the concentration of
shareholdings. In 1990, institutional investors owned forty-five percent of
outstanding corporate equity. 199 Pension funds, the largest class of institu-
tional investors, owned roughly forty-four percent of all institutional hold-
ings in 1987.200
Controlling more than $2.5 trillion in assets in 1990, pension funds at
that time ownedmore than 25% of all publicly traded equity in United States
companies.2 1 This is particularly noteworthy because, on average, a pension
fund holds any given stock in its portfolios for two and one-half years.202
The most recent statistics are no less staggering. While in 1990 the
assets of institutional investors as a group equaled $6.3 billion, this number
grew to $12 trillion by the end of 1996 and $14.3 trillion by the end of
1997.203 These figures represent a 125% increase from 1990 to 1998.204 Pen-
sion funds controlled approximately 48% of these assets while mutual funds
controlled approximately 21%,201 with various other institutional players
holding the remainder.
As a result of these holdings, institutional investors command approxi-
mately 48% of total United States equity markets. With respect to the larg-
est 1,000 United States companies, their stake is even higher, approximating
59%.
Although the motivations of and variations between institutional inves-
tors is beyond the scope of this article, 206 the primary impetus for increased
shareholder activism likely stems from shareholders' increased ownership
concentration. Voting power is increasingly concentrated in a small number
198. See John C. Bogle, Creating Shareholder Yalue for Mutual Fund Shareholders, 20 CORPORATE BOARD 1 (999).
199. See Richard H. Koppes & Kayla J. Gillan, The Shareholder Advisory Committee. DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Spring
1991, at 29.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. See James A. White. Pension Funds Try to Retire Idea That They Are Villains, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20. 1990. at C I.
Investments in common stock by state and local pension systems ballooned from S 10.1 billion in 1970 to $150.2 bil-
lion in 1986 and to an estimated $240 billion in institutional holdings in 1990. Whitewall, supra note 197, at 75, 79. Although
equity holdings of private pension funds have been relatively stable since 1982, state and local government pension holdings have
increased markedly; in 1988, they owned a total of $223.7 billion in stocks, or 9. 1% of the NYS's total market value. See id.
203. See US. Institutional Investors Sharply Step Up Asset Holdings: Public Pension Funds Continue to Gain Clout in
Governance Matters, PR NEwSwIRE (June II, 1998). 1
204. See Matthew Greco, Institutions Keep Growing, INVESTOR ELA'IONS BUSINESS, July 6, 1998.
205. See id.
206. See generally THEODOR BAUMS ET AL., INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1993); CAM-
ILLE Q. BRADFORD ET AL., NATIONAL LEGAL CENTER FOR THE PUBLIC INTERET, INSTITTIONAL INVESTORS, SOCIAL INVESTING.
AND CORPROATE GOVERNANCE (1996) (hereinafter SOCIAL INVESTING].
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of major institutions. In 1989, the top twenty funds and top ten money man-
agers controlled 16% of all equity; by the year 2000, they may control up to
29% of the equity in the top ten corporations.2 7 The twenty largest pension
funds have accounted for more than 25% of all pension assets. Then, the top
twenty funds have controlled at least 7.7% of the outstanding stock of Amer-
ican's ten largest corporations.2 °8
Increasingly concentrated share ownership drives institutional activism
in two ways. First, institutions that own a large stake in a corporation are
less able to sell their shares and take the "Wall Street walk. '' 2°9 As James
Martin of College Retirement Equities Fund (CREF) attests, "We're the
quintessential long-term investors. ''210 In addition, a greater stake means a
greater incentive to invest time and resources in improving corporate moni-
toring and performance. Finally, institutional investors' size and share con-
centration enhance their ability to monitor and discipline management. The
marked increase in management entrenchment that has accompanied the
death of the takeover era, however, probably also fuels shareholder activism.
In his comprehensive study of global competition, Michael E. Porter
identifies the growth of institutional investors in the United States to a posi-
tion of dominance over corporations as the most significant factor in the
decline of the country's competitiveness:
Unlike institutional investors in nearly every other advanced
nation, who view their shareholdings as nearly permanent and
exercise their ownership rights accordingly, American institutions
are under pressure to demonstrate quarterly appreciation .... With
a strong incentive to find companies whose shares will appreciate
in the near term and incomplete information about long-term pros-
pects, portfolio managers turn to quarterly earnings performance
as perhaps the single biggest influence on buy/sell decisions.21'
B. Increased Institutional Shareholder Activity
Even before the massive holdings of today's institutional investors,
shareholder activism existed. At least from the 1930s through the early
1980s, however, the likely points of focus were social and political issues,
such as apartheid, the environment, and international labor concerns. These
social responsibility issues gave rise to 130 shareholder proposals in 1976
and 230 proposals in 1994.212
Beginning in the mid-1980s, however, corporate governance matters
207. See William Taylor, Can Big Owners Make a Big Difference?, HARV. BUS. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1990, at 70, 72.
208. See Koppes & Gillan, supra note 199.
209. See Matheson & Olson, supra note 10, at 1477-82 (describing behavior differences between institutional investors
and individual investors).
210. David Pauly, Wall Street's New Musclemeet. NEWswEEK, June 5, 1989, at 46.
211. Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations 528 (1990).
212. See SOCIAl. INVESTING. supra note 206. at 26-27.
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started to come to the forefront. These issues included changes in the com-
position, compensation and operation of the board of directors, confidential
and cumulative voting issues for shareholders, as well as a number of issues
relating to takeover matters, including the poison pill shareholder rights
plans. The focus on these matters resulted in a nearly 400% increase in such
proposals from 1986 to 1990.213 In 1995, 520 shareholder resolutions were
proposed on a variety of governance matters. In 1998 that number stood at
429, with 261 social issue proposals being made, and forty-seven proposals
that overlapped the two categories.2 14
Of particular relevance for our analysis, shareholder proposals seeking
to redeem or require a shareholder vote on rights plans have been a favorite
area for institutional investors. Between 1989 and 1996, poison pill propos-
als averaged affirmative votes of 40% of more. During the same period,
fifty-two of these proposals received majority affirmative votes.215 In 1996,
proposals to redeem or vote on poison pills averaged 53.4%, with eight reso-
lutions receiving majority backing.216 In 1997, poison pill votes averaged
54.9%, with fifteen receiving majority support, including three that were
framed in terms of binding bylaw amendments.217 Finally, in 1998, poison
pill proposals garnered a record 57.4% support.218
Institutional shareholder activism on corporate governance has not
been limited to making shareholder proposals. Several prominent share-
holder groups promulgated "corporate governance guidelines" for suggested
adoption by companies. 219 These guidelines reflected a revised operation of
the boards of directors and management of companies to be more attuned to
the desires of the companies' shareholders to enhance shareholder value.
Beyond proposals and guidelines, the institutional investors have begun
to exercise their clout directly. More and more often there are calls for
replacing the board of directors or the chief executive officer.220 Last year
one institutional investor, TIAA-CREF, spearheaded an insurgent effort that
resulted in the complete ouster and replacement of the Furr's/Bishop's board
of directors.22' Another investor group, during a three-year period, helped to
remove eight board members and two CEOs from Stone & Webster Engi-
neering Corporation.222
Clearly, the ascendancy of the institutional investor foreshadowed a
showdown for corporate boards and management. The most logical place
for this showdown to focus was in the continued retention and use of share-
213. Seeid. at28.
214. See IRRC, Summary of 1998 U.S. Shareholder Resolutions, Feb. 3. 1999 (hereinafter "IRRC Summary"].
215. See IRRC, Corporate Governance Service 1997 Background Report F: Poison Pill, Feb. 21, 1997, at 1.
216. See id.
217. See 1RRC, Corporate Governance Service 1998 Background Report E: Poison Pill, June 25, 1998, at 2.
218. See IRRC Summary,supra note 214, at 2.
219. See, e.g., Calpers. CII Approve Corporate Governance Gulletin, IIRC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BULLETIN, Vol.
XV, No. I (Jan.-Mar. 1998), at 1.
220. See Weld Royal, Impeach the Board, INDUSTRY WEEK, Nov. 16, 1998, at 47.
22 1. See id.
222. See id.
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holder rights plans. After all, from the institutional shareholder perspective,
to the extent that these poison pill rights plans were effective in deterring
hostile acquisition overtures, shareholders were being deprived of the oppor-
tunity to maximize the value of their substantial investments in the subject
companies.
VI. THE DETOXIFICATION OF THE POISON PILL
A. The Importance of Staggered Boards and the "Continuing Director"
Concept
The increased holdings of institutional investors in the mid-i 990s dem-
onstrated that they had the potential to recreate the corporate governance
framework. This power they employed in some relatively minor ways, such
as making shareholder proposals and proffering governance guidelines.
More rarely and episodically, institutional investors displayed dispositive
power, such as replacing a board of directors or pressuring for the resigna-
tion of a CEO.
In order for institutional investors to fundamentally affect the gover-
nance landscape, however, they needed to be able to demonstrate that they
could regularly initiate or cooperate with a third party in change of control
transactions with respect to companies that were deemed not to be perform-
ing adequately. But the factor that arguably prevented maximum share
value realization also prevented change of control transactions, namely, the
poison pill. Still, poison pills could be redeemed by the board of directors of
a company and, now that institutional shareholders held sufficient shares to
potentially replace a board of directors, a potential hostile party could con-
sider making a tender offer and combining it with a proxy contest to replace
the target company board and redeem the poison pill before the tender was
completed. Thus, in a little over a decade, and much to the dismay of
incumbent public company management, the proxy contest poison pill
redemption scenario that the court in Moran v. Household International,
Inc.223 identified as one justification for upholding rights plans as not pre-
cluding hostile takeovers had become a realistic possibility.
The prospect of poison pill redemption after replacing a recalcitrant or
underachieving board seemed a likely scenario except for several factors.
Initially, many publicly traded companies have classified, or staggered
boards, 224 like the structure of the United States Senate. With a classified
board, directors are typically divided into three classes, serve for three year
terms, with only one-third of the directors being up for election in any given
year. Arguably serving the positive goals of stability and continuity for
223. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). For a discussion of the Moran case, see supra notes 151-62 and accompanying text.
224. See IRRC, Corporate Governance Service 1998 Background Report C: Classified Boards, Mar. 3, 1998, at 1-2 (stat-
ing that 58.4% of the 1,900 companies in the IRRC research universe and 59.7% of the Standard & Poor's 500 companies have
classified boards).
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company policy making and management, from a cynical perspective stag-
gered boards are a means of management entrenchment.
Particularly when paired with a poison pill rights plan, a classified
board has the potential to assist incumbent management to "just say no" to
hostile overtures without fear of immediate reversal by institutional share-
holders. That is, while the rights plan prevents the hostile party from com-
pleting the tender offer at a presumed premium price to current shareholders,
the staggered board prevents the institutional shareholders from immedi-
ately replacing a majority of the board who could redeem the rights and let
the tender offer proceed. Since it would take at least two successive annual
meetings to replace the target board of directors, the effect of the poison pill,
combined with the classified board, is to provide a substantial roadblock to
the hostile takeover, even in companies where a substantial majority of the
shares are held by institutional investors.
Given these facts, it is not surprising that shareholder proposals to
repeal classified boards have been on the increase. In 1997, shareholder
support for proposals to repeal classified boards averaged 43.8% of the votes
cast, an increase of 1.6% over the 1996 average, and 17.5% higher than in
1986.225 In 1998, over seventy shareholder proposals to repeal classified
boards were made, with those that were voted on receiving an average of
47.3% of the vote.226
However, the benefits of a classified or staggered board were not avail-
able to those companies without that device currently in place. In light of
the history of repeal proposals listed above, institutional investors would not
look favorably upon a management attempt to implement a classified board.
Moreover, even companies with existing classified boards faced the risk that
shareholders would find a way to eliminate the classification or that the
board would voluntarily seek to eliminate the classification in response to
shareholder pressure.
Another device was needed to protect the rights plans from potential
redemption as part of a proxy fight. That is, what could a current board of
directors do to prevent redemption of a rights plan even if a hostile party,
with the support of institutional investors, was able to wage a proxy contest
and replace the whole incumbent board? If repeal of the rights plan could
not be accomplished under these circumstances, the proxy contest itself
would most likely be seen as futile and would not take place. The desired
device was the "continuing director" or "dead hand" redemption provision.
A "continuing director" or "dead hand" provision gives exclusive authority
to redeem the rights plan, and thereby allow an acquisition proposal to pro-
ceed, to the "continuing directors," that is, either (1) members of the board at
the time of adoption of the rights plan, or (2) those future members of the
board recommended by the current board members. This latter clause,
225. See id. at 1.
226. See IRRC Summary, supra note 214, at I.
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requiring current board members to approve of any future board members
who would have the right to redeem the rights plan is what gives the provi-
sion its "dead hand" feature. Even if removed from office, the "dead hand"
of the replaced directors would control the rights plan redemption decision
since only new board members approved by the replaced board members
would have the power to redeem the rights.
B. The Continuing Director Concept is Defeated
The first blow to the continuing director concept came in Carmody v.
Toll Brothers, Inc.227 The Carmody case was the first Delaware decision
addressing the "continuing director" or "dead hand" redemption feature
included in many shareholder rights plans.228 In response to a motion to dis-
miss the complaint, the court determined that the complaint stated a valid
claim that the "dead hand" provision violated both the Delaware corporate
statute and the fiduciary duties of the board that adopted it.
Toll Brothers, Inc. adopted its Shareholder Rights Plan prior to any
takeover overture, and the court reaffirmed the propriety of adoption of a
shareholder rights plan in light of what a board of directors might perceive
as harmful potential hostile proposals. The Toll Rights Plan, however, con-
tained a provision giving the decision of whether to redeem the Rights Plan
(and thereby allow an acquisition proposal to proceed) exclusively to the
"continuing directors," that is, (1) members of the Board at the time of adop-
tion of the Rights Plan, and (2) those future members of the Board recom-
mended by the current Board members (the "continuing director" or "dead
hand provision"). This dead hand provision was challenged in a suit by Toll
shareholders as violating Delaware statutes and the fiduciary duties of the
Board that adopted it.
On the statutory claim, the court found that the dead hand provision
impermissibly created two separate classes of directors, namely, those serv-
ing at the time of the Rights Plan adoption and their designated successors,
as distinguished from all others. The court held that such distinctions under
Delaware law could only be accomplished by creating a classified board and
expressing the distinctions among classes of directors in the articles of
incorporation. Since this was not done, the provision was likely to be found
to violate the Delaware statute. In addition, the Court also accepted the
claim that the dead hand provision might impermissibly restrict the authority
of a Board to manage the Company by limiting the discretion of newly
elected board members to redeem the Rights Plan. The Company responded
by arguing that board authority for certain decisions is often validly dele-
gated to committees of the board. The court rejected this analogy, respond-
227. 1998 WL 418896 (Del. Ch. July 27,1998).
228. Two other courts had addressed the concept, reaching conflicting conclusions. Compare Bank of New York Co.,
Inc. v. Irving Bank Corp., 528 N.Y.S.2d 482 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (invalidating the provision) with Invacare Corp. v. Healthdyne
Techs.. Inc.. 968 F. Supp. 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (validating provision under Georgia law). Because of Delaware's importance as
the home state for many publicly held corporations, these decisions did not carry substantial weight.
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ing first, that no committee had been created and second, that any board
committee would still be subject to abolition at any time by the board.
On the fiduciary duties claim, the court found that the plaintiffs stated a
claim that inclusion of the "dead hand" provision by the Toll Board violated
the Board's duty of loyalty. First, the court concluded that the "dead hand"
provision impermissibly interfered with the shareholder voting franchise
without any compelling justification. The disenfranchisement occurs
because, in a hostile proxy situation, Toll shareholders would be unable to
"elect a boaid that is both willing and able to accept the bid" since new pro-
bid directors would be unlikely to have been recommended by the current
Board, and those recommended by the current Board would be unlikely to
redeem the Rights Plan.
Second, the court found that inclusion of the "dead hand" provision
constituted a disproportionate defensive measure under the analysis of the
Delaware Supreme Court decisions in Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum229 and
Unitrin v. American GeneraP30 because it was both coercive and preclusive.
First, the court stated that the complaint stated a claim that the "dead hand"
provision "coerced" Toll shareholders into voting for incumbent directors or
their designees in order to preserve the option of redeeming the Rights Plan.
Second, the court found that the complaint also alleged that the dead hand
provision effectively "precluded" hostile bids since a proxy contest could
not succeed in electing a board with the power to redeem the Rights Plan
For the many companies with continuing director provisions in their
shareholder rights plans, Carmody was a serious blow. Still, some hope
existed. First, the court's decision was not a final adjudication, having come
in response to a motion to dismiss the complaint. However, while the man-
ner of addressing issues in that context means that the court thinks that the
plaintiffs have stated a valid claim, the court's analysis and language left lit-
tle doubt as to the ultimate result. Second, and more hopefully, the court
made it clear that it was not deciding whether some lesser form of redemp-
tion-limiting provision, such as a delayed or "slow hand" provision preclud-
ing redemption of the Rights Plan for a specified period, such as six months,
would be acceptable.231
The Delaware Supreme Court put this latter issue to rest on December
31, 1998, with its decision in Quickturn Design Systems, Inc. v. Shapiro.232
That case involved Mentor Graphics, a hostile bidder, who sought control of
Quickturn by launching a tender offer and a proxy contest. The tender offer
was commenced when Quickturn's stock was depressed below historical
levels, but still offered Quickturn shareholders a fifty percent premium over
Quickturn's immediate pre-offer price.233 The proxy contest was launched
229. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
230. 651 A.2d 1361, 1379 (Del. 1995).
231. See Carmody, 1998 WL 418896, at n.52.
232. 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998).
233. See Id. at 1285.
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with the express intention of replacing Quickturn's board with members
sympathetic to the hostile overture.234
Quickturn had in place a state of the art Shareholder Rights Plan with
both flip-in and flip-over rights. In addition, the Rights Plan contained a
"continuing director" or "dead hand" redemption provision.235 When the
board of directors of Quickturn met on August 21, 1998 to take action in
response to Mentor's actions, the decision in Carmody had come down less
than a month before, leaving the validity of the continuing director provision
in serious doubt. Quickturn's Board, therefore, amended the Rights Plan to
substitute a delayed redemption provision for the continuing director provi-
sion (DRP). 236 Pursuant to the DRP, no newly elected Board could redeem
the Rights for 180 days if the redemption would facilitate a transaction with
an "Interested Person," defined to include Mentor.237 It is this DRP provision
of the Rights Plan that Mentor chose to challenge because of its potential to
delay any proposed takeover of Quickturn by Mentor.
The Delaware Supreme Court viewed the issue as one of fundamental
corporate law. While affirming the authority of a board of directors to adopt
a Rights Plan, the Court noted that the authority of the board is constrained
by fiduciary obligations in its determination of whether to redeem the
Rights. 238 More directly, the Court stated that "one of the most basic tenets
of Delaware corporate law is that the board of directors has the ultimate
responsibility for managing the business and affairs of a corporation" and
Delaware law "requires that any limitation on the board's authority be set
out in the certificate of incorporation. '239
Turning to the DRP, the court found that this provision "would prevent
a newly elected board of directors from completely discharging its funda-
mental management duties to the corporation and its stockholders for six
months. '240 These duties apply in all situations, including a contest for cor-
porate control. Indeed, that was one of the fundamental holdings in Unocal.
Therefore, because the DRP "impermissibly circumscribed the board's stat-
utory power ... and the directors' ability to fulfill' their concomitant fidu-
ciary duties, [the Unocal Court held] that the [DRP was] invalid. '241
With the Quickturn decision, hostile suitors and institutional investors
won a significant victory. In effect, a Shareholder Rights Plan, by itself, is
only a significant defensive mechanism if the incumbent board is able to
234. See id. Quicktum's Board, however, was not staggered or classified and therefore could be replaced all at once at a
special or annual meeting of the shareholders.
235. See id. at 1287. In fact, the Quickturn version of the continuing director provision was limited in its operation.
Generally, the Board as a whole had the right to redeem the Rights. If, however, an insurgent person or group acquired 15% or
more of Quicklum's stock and replaced the Board, only continuing directors, that is, pre-replacement directors or those directors
nominated by pre-replacement directors, could redeem the Rights. See Quickturn, 721 A.2d at 1289.
236. See id.
237. See id. at 1289-90.
238. See id. at 1291 (citing Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954-55,
958).
239. Quickturn, 721 A.2d at 1291 (relying on DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1293,
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prevail in a proxy contest to replace the board. That is, if a corporation does
not have a staggered board, all directors may be removed at any regular or
special meeting of the shareholders.2 42 For companies with institutional
shareholders holding a major portion of the company's stock, which is the
case with many publicly-held companies, this factor gives these institutional
shareholders great power and leverage with management and the board of
directors
For corporations with staggered boards, however, and where directors
otherwise may be removed only for cause,243 the Quickturn decision is less
significant. In this circumstance, only a third of the directors may be
replaced at any given election. It would take two successive elections to
replace a majority of the board. Since only the entire board by majority vote
has the authority to redeem the Rights under a Shareholder Rights Plan, the
net result is effectively somewhere between a one and two-year delayed
redemption provision, given the timing of the elections. After Quickturn,
the importance of a staggered board to the efficacy of a poison pill is evi-
dent.
Thus, while the combined results in Carmody and Quickturn serve as
an antidote to the operation of the poison pill for some publicly-traded com-
panies, still others, those with staggered boards, are left with their defenses
effectively in place. Another means to neutralize the shareholder rights plan
was necessary. The means of choice for institutional investors has been the
mandatory shareholder rights plan bylaw.244
C. Mandatory Bylaw Provisions: Whose Company Is It Anyway?
For companies with poison pills and staggered boards, institutional
shareholders unhappy with incumbent management face the prospect of
winning two proxy contests to replace a majority of the board of directors in
order to redeem a poison pill. Even where a company does not have a clas-
sified board, the issue of redemption cannot be addressed by the sharehold-
ers directly. Rather, shareholders must first replace the board of directors
and then have the new directors redeem the Rights under the Rights Plan.
This may not be palatable, however, especially where the shareholders are
not generally dissatisfied with board performance, but rather would simply
prefer not to have a poison pill in place. Add to these issues the fact that
boards have generally ignored the non-binding votes of shareholders asking
that a poison pill be redeemed, even where a majority shareholder vote
favored the action,245 and the stage was set for a more direct way to deal with
institutional shareholder unhappiness with Rights Plans.
242. See, e.g., DEL COo E ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(b), (k) (1998).
243. This is the result under the Delaware statute. See Id. § 141 (kXl) (1998).
244. See generally Jeffrey N. Gordon, "Just Say Never?" Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and Shareholder.Adopted
Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffett, 19 CARDO L. REv. 511 (1997); Jonathan R. Macey. The Legality and Utility of the
Shareholder Rights Bylaw, 26 HOFSTRA L. REv. 835 (1998).
245. See 1998 Poison Pill Report, sapra note 8, at 1-2.
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In 1997 three shareholder proposals upon which votes were taken took
the form of proposed binding bylaw amendments.2 46 One of these, at Flem-
ing Companies, received majority shareholder approval2 47 and was the sub-
ject of dispositive litigation in early 1999.248 Fleming Companies had
adopted a Rights Plan in 1986, which was scheduled for renewal or lapse in
1996. In that year the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, a Fleming
Companies shareholder, put forth a non-binding rights plan redemption pro-
posal that received a majority shareholder vote. Fleming ignored the vote
and renewed the Rights Plan.2 49
In 1997 the Teamsters raised the stakes and proposed a binding bylaw
amendment requiring shareholder approval of any future Rights Plan and
immediate redemption of the existing Rights Plan.250 Fleming filed suit,
challenging the proposal as an improper subject for shareholder action and
seeking to delay the vote on the issue. The delay was denied and the resolu-
tion passed by approximately sixty percent of the voted shares.251 Having
lost the battle of the vote, Fleming sought to win the war by seeking a judi-
cial determination that the bylaw was invalid, arguing that the decision to
adopt or redeem a Rights Plan is uniquely a function of the board of direc-
tors.
252
The Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed this issue as one primarily of
statutory interpretation, with the Oklahoma statutes representing fairly typi-
cal formulations of the matters addressed.253 On the one hand the Oklahoma
corporate statute generally reposes responsibility for managing the company
with the board of directors. In addition, the board has general authority to
issue rights to purchase stock, of which the Rights Plan is one form, and to
designate the rights and preferences of those rights to purchase. On the
other hand, the same statute provides that the shareholders may adopt
bylaws to govern the corporation and those bylaws may contain any provi-
sion relating to the operation of the corporation.254 In the context of the
shareholder rights plan bylaw requiring board redemption or termination of
a poison pill, the tension between these provisions is apparent. Presump-
tively, one of these sets of provisions had to prevail.
As a matter of statutory interpretation, it should be seen that there is no
ineluctable result.255 Does the board's power to create rights to purchase pre-
vail over the shareholders' right to adopt bylaws governing corporate activi-
246. See id. at 2.
247. See id.
248. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Fleming Cos., Inc., 1999 WL 35227 (Okla. Jan. 26, 1999). An earlier
case, Invacare Corp. v. Healthdyne Technologies, Ind., 968 F. Supp 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1997) held that a proposed bylaw requiring
redemption of a Rights Plan was invalid as an unlawful restriction on the board's authority. Georgia, however, had explicitly
adopted a statute endorsing the board's authority to create a Rights Plan and to determine its terms. See id. at 1580.
249. See Fleming, 1999 WL 35227, at *2.
250. See id. at n.3.
251. See id. at :2.
252. See id. at3.
253. Indeed, as the Court noted, the Oklahoma statutes at issue were "substantially similar" to their Delaware counter-
parts. Fleming, 1999 WL 35227, at *3.
254. See id.
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ties or vice versa? The Fleming court, while required to reach a result,
found no compelling rationale. It noted that some option plans, of which a
Rights Plan is one kind, are required to be put to shareholder approval.256
The court also noted that some states, although not Oklahoma, had adopted
statutes giving directors explicit and exclusive authority to adopt Rights
Plans.257 Ultimately, the court upheld the bylaw's validity, concluding sim-
ply: "we find shareholders may, through the proper channels of corporate
governance, restrict the board of directors' authority to implement share-
holder rights plans." 258 But the statutory provisions interpreted in Fleming
and existing in many other states' corporate codes are malleable. That is,
given the inconclusive nature of the statutory provisions involved, the Court
could just as easily have concluded that "we find no basis to allow share-
holders to limit the otherwise statutorily defined management discretion and
authority of the board of directors to issue rights to purchase securities,
including the implementation and redemption of shareholder rights plans."
Beneath the surface issue of the validity of these binding bylaw amend-
ments lies a fundamental corporate governance issue: do the shareholders or
the directors have the ultimate authority to determine whether, and on what
terms, a proposed acquisition of a target company's shares occurs? Phrased
differently, should the board of directors of a company have exclusive
authority to determine if the market for corporate control acts as a check on
corporate management?
These questions take us back to a reconsideration of the role of the
board of directors in potential change of control transactions, such as hostile
tender offers. The Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal stated that the role of
the board, when faced with a hostile takeover proposal, is "no different from
any other responsibility it shoulders .... -29 But there are differences! The
board's role as "gatekeeper" for other fundamental corporate transactions is
statutorily specified.260 Indeed, the reason that the most recent poison pill
proposals come in the form of "bylaw" amendments as opposed to "article"
amendments is that, under Delaware and many other states' corporate laws,
no amendment of the articles or certificate of incorporation can take place
without initial board approval.261 For these statutorily defined gatekeeper
functions, then, the board has not only initial but also exclusive authority to
determine if the transaction proceeds.
The board's authority to preempt takeover proposals, on the other hand,
255. Compare Chazen, The Shareholder Rights Bylaw: Giving Shareholders a Decisive Vote, 5 THE CORPORATE GOV-
ERNANCE ADVISOR Jan..Feb. 1997, at 8 (Delaware law permits shareholder rights bylaw) with Hamermesh, The Shareholder
Rights Bylaw. Doubts from Delaware, 5 THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ADVISOR Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 9 (Delaware does not per-
mit shareholder rights bylaw).
256. See Fleming, 1999 WL 35227, at *4.
257. See id. at *5 (citing Matheson & Olson, supra note 10).
258. ld. at 6.
259. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956 (Del. 1985).
260. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
261. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN, tit. 8, § 242(bXl) (1991) ("its board ofdirectors shall adopt a resolution"). Compare,
e.g., MINN. STAT. 302A. 135 (1999) (shareholders holding three percent or more of the voting power of the shares may initiate
amendment to articles).
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does not find explicit statutory recognition. That is why the Unocal court
had to address the issue of board authority in that context. Unocal, however,
only explicitly recognized the existence of board authority to address take-
over proposals or other corporate control transactions. The existence of
authority does not necessarily imply either exclusivity of that authority or
that the authority is ultimate and cannot be limited or countermanded.
Accepting, then, the board's presumptive initial authority to address
potential corporate control transactions, for example, by adoption of a share-
holder rights plan, can that authority be limited by the shareholders through
a shareholder rights bylaw? Is the board's initial authority also exclusive or
do the shareholders have a voice on the matter as well? Further, whose
authority is ultimate? The answers to these questions are crucial because
"[t]he market for corporate control lies at the heart of the American system
of corporate governance. 2 62
These fundamental issues have more to do with policy and politics than
with statutory interpretation. The policy issue relates to the determination of
the relative roles of the board and the shareholders in relation to the market
for corporate control. That is, there is an opportunity here for Delaware and
other states that have to address these issues to reach a reasonable accommo-
dation or balance of the competing interests. A court could realign these
roles so that, while the board has presumptive initial authority to address
takeover issues and, for example, to adopt a poison pill, that authority is nei-
ther exclusive nor ultimate. Rather, the shareholders, either before or after
adoption by the board of a defensive mechanism, such as a poison pill, can
limit board authority or discretion. Additionally, from this perspective, if the
board and the shareholders reach differing conclusions on the same issue as
it relates to the market for corporate control, the view of the shareholders
should ultimately prevail. Under this analysis, while board-adopted poison
pills would continue to be valid, appropriately adopted shareholder rights
plan bylaws would also be valid and could modify or terminate board-
adopted structural defensive mechanisms, such as a poison pill.
At least one prominent Delaware case supports this conclusion. In
Frantz Manufacturing Co. v. EAC Industries, 63 EAC sought control of
Frantz and purchased approximately fifty-one percent of the stock of Frantz
from various parties.2c6 EAC then tendered shareholder consents to Frantz
which made changes in the bylaws and required, inter alia, (1) that all direc-
tors to be present for a quorum; (2) unanimous vote of directors for any
board action; and (3) stockholder approval for indemnification of direc-
tors.26 Frantz challenged these bylaw changes. In language that could be
applied, with slight variation, to the current shareholder rights plan bylaw
262. Jonathan R. Maccy & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Governance and Commercial Banking: A Comparative Exam-
ination of Germany, Japan, and the United States, 48 STAN. L. REV. 73, 101 (1992).
263. 501 A.2d 401 (Del. 1985).
264. See id. at 405.
265. See id.
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dispute, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld these bylaw amendments:
The bylaw amendments were unique in that they required attendance of
all directors for a quorum and unanimous approval of the board of directors
before board action can be taken, and they thereby limited the functioning of
the Frantz board.... In this case, however, the Court of Chancery found
that the restrictions placed on the Frantz board were intended to limit the
Frantz board's anti-takeover maneuvering after EAC had gained control of
the corporation. We agree with the Court of Chancery that the EAC bylaw
amendments were a permissible part of EAC's attempt to avoid its disen-
franchisement as a majority shareholder and hold that the bylaw amend-
ments should be given effect .... 266
These issues, however, also have political, and economic, dimensions.
The management of many publicly held companies have come to rely on the
Delaware courts to regularly, though not without exception, reach a decid-
edly pro-management result on disputed corporate issues. The pro-manage-
ment result here is invalidation of shareholder rights bylaws. While
apparently, and historically this is the politically expedient result, such a
conclusion could backfire for Delaware and other states so inclined. Argu-
ably, if institutional shareholders have enough clout to adopt a shareholder
rights bylaw, they may also have the ability, at least in some corporations, to
adopt a proposal to reincorporate in a state, such as Oklahoma, willing to
find a balance between board authority and shareholder mandates. 2 67 The net
result could be a possible loss of status, and revenues, for states insensitive
to achieving a balance on these crucial corporate governance issues.
VII. CONCLUSION
Much has changed in the fifteen years since the first adoption of a
shareholder rights plan. At the time of its introduction, the poison pill oper-
ated as a show stopper, giving the target company board of directors plenary
authority to determine which takeover proposal, if any, to accept. Since
then, however, the ownership profile for publicly-held corporations has
become increasingly concentrated in the hands of institutional shareholders.
These shareholders typically view the primary antitakeover mechanism, the
shareholder rights plan, or poison pill, with anathema, and have sought to
remove it or limit its applicability. The most recent means for accomplish-
ing these restrictions comes in the form of shareholder rights plan bylaws.
While appearing to be presumptively a matter of statutory interpreta-
tion, the validity of these proposed rights plan bylaws implicates more fun-
damental issues of corporate governance, as well as the policy and politics
266. Id. at 407.
267. This is not a favored option for a variety of reasons. First, reincorporation implicates more than simply the partic-
ular defensive mechanism involved and therefore complicates the issue even more than the current situation, which requires
shareholders to remove the board in order to achieve poison pill redemption. Second, given the complexity of the issue. it is
unlikely that even institutional shareholders will have the time and energy to focus on the matter to the extent necessary to present
the proposal adequately to the shareholders.
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of court resolution of corporate law issues. The shareholder rights plan
bylaw dispute provides state courts with a convenient opportunity to clarify
and define the relative roles of the board of directors and the shareholders in
corporate issues as they relate to the market for corporate control. As sug-
gested in this Article, one reasonable balance of these roles is to allow the
board authority and discretion initially to adopt antitakeover measures, but
concurrently to recognize the ultimate authority of the shareholders to limit
or preempt that authority.
In any event, the stage is set for another round of state-by-state experi-
mentation with respect to important issues of corporate law and governance.
With fifty states as experimental corporate governance labs, not only will a
variety of resolutions result, but an array of corporate governance options
will be presented to companies and their shareholders. Especially where, as
here, the issue is one where there is a reasonable basis to provide alternative
corporate governance formulations, structures and results, this state-by-state
resolution may in fact be the best means to provide the participants with a
smorgasbord of corporate law and governance options.
1999)

